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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), as this 
matter was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court from a final judgment of the Third 
District Court, and the appeal was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to this 
Court. (Order Transferring Appeal, R. 1080-81.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, dismissing 
Plaintiff/Appellant Albert Sandberg's legal malpractice claim against Defendant/Appel-
lee Lehman, Jensen & Donahue, L.C., on the ground that the claim that Defendant 
neglected to file, a personal injury claim against Salt Lake City, would have been 
barred by the Governmental Immunity Act's discretionary function exception. 
(Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Memorandum for Summary Judgment, R. 892-
1007 (hereafter "Oppo. Mem.").) 
This issue involves two sub-issues: 
a. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the discretionary func-
tion exception of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) would have applied to the claim 
against the City that Defendant failed to bring on Mr. Sandberg's behalf. (Oppo. 
Mem.,R. 905-14.) 
b. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to hold that barring Mr. 
Sandberg's claim against the City under the Act would have violated article I, section 
11 of the Utah Constitution. (Oppo. Mem., R. 914-17.) 
1 
Standard of Review 
In reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, all facts and inferences 
are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party (Mr. Sandberg), and no 
deference is given to the trial court's ruling. E.g., Coulter & Smith. Ltd. v. Russell. 
966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998); Badger v. Brooklvn Canal Co.. 922 P.2d 745, 748 
(Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Const, art. L 8 11: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in 
his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and 
no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any 
tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-9: 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set 
forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for any injury caused from a dangerous or defective condition 
of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public 
improvement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out 
of, in connection with, or results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused . . . . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a legal malpractice claim by Mr. Sandberg against Defendant, Mr. Sand-
berg's former counsel, for failing to timely file Mr. Sandberg's personal injury claim 
against Salt Lake City. Mr. Sandberg was injured when he fell into an unguarded five-
foot-deep concrete pit while using the Salt Lake Valley Landfill, and he retained Defen-
dant to represent him. Defendant sued Salt Lake County and received a $100,000 
settlement, but Defendant neglected to file a claim against Salt Lake City, which 
designed and co-owned the Facility, and the time to file such a claim expired. Mr. 
Sandberg asserts that the City was negligent in failing to have a safety chain or other 
barrier along the edge of the pit and in maintaining a dangerously narrow sidewalk 
along the pit. 
Course of Proceedings. 
Mr. Sandberg initiated this action on November 2, 2000, and demanded a jury 
trial on November 22, the day after Defendant answered. (Complaint, R. 1-6; Answer, 
R. 10-15; Jury Demand, R. 16-17.) On November 21, 2001, Defendant moved for 
summary judgment. (Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 123-26.) A hearing on the 
motion took place on January 10, 2002, at which the trial court verbally granted the 
motion. (Hearing Transcript, R. 1083.) The order dismissing the claim was entered 
on January 22, 2002. (Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 
1072-74, Addendum Exhibit 1 hereto.) Mr. Sandberg's notice of appeal was filed 
January 31, 2002. (Notice of Appeal, R. 1075-77.) 
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Statement of Facts 
A. Mr. Sandberg's Accident. 
Plaintiff Albert Sandberg was severely injured on March 25, 1996, when he 
slipped and fell into the Citizens' Unloading Facility (the "Facility") at the Salt Lake 
Valley Solid Waste Facility (the "Landfill"). (Complaint 1 1, R. 1-2.) The Facility, 
which opened in approximately 1991, featured a central pit, with access roads on both 
sides, so that the Facility's users could drive up to the edge of the pit and dump their 
nonhazardous wastes, which would then be pushed out of the pit by front-end loaders 
and disposed of along with other waste dumped at the Landfill. (See Facility Diagram, 
R. 643, Addendum Exhibit 3; Photographs, R. 931, Addendum Exhibit 4.) A six-foot-
wide sidewalk separated the driving surface from the edge of the pit, which left very 
little space for individuals to stand when unloading their vehicles, particularly when 
tailgates were lowered.1 (Deposition of Bud Stanford, R. 940; Photographs; Expert 
Report, R. 869.) The edge of the dumping pit was completely unguarded by bar-
ricades, chains, or other features, even though the edge had a potential fall of five feet 
onto hard concrete. (Photographs; Expert Report.) 
Not surprisingly, at least a dozen people were injured, some severely, by falling 
into the pit between 1992 and March 1996. (Summary of Dumping Pit Injuries, R. 
929.) Another three people were injured in the summer of 1996, after which the 
sidewalk was widened to nine feet and a chain was installed to keep people from falling 
1
 When the Facility was built, the sidewalk was three feet wide; it was widened 
to six feet sometime between 1991 and 1996. (Stanford Depo., R. 940.) 
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into the pit. (Injury Summary, R. 929; Stanford Depo., R. 937, 940-41, 951-52.) 
Since then, not a single person has been significantly injured from falling into the pit. 
(Stanford Depo., R. 947-48.) Accordingly, there is "no consideration . . . at all" to 
removing the chain. (Stanford Depo., R. 949.) 
When Mr. Sandberg arrived at the Facility on March 25, he backed his truck up 
about a foot away from the curb, which left him less than two feet of room behind the 
open tailgate on his truck. (Deposition of Albert Sandberg at 33, 37, R. 843-44.) Mr. 
Sandberg was careful to avoid the edge, but his foot slipped on an icy patch of the 
sidewalk as he stepped out of the truck, and he fell into the pit, first landing hard on his 
feet and then hitting his head on the concrete floor. (Sandberg Depo. at 42-51, R. 845-
47.) Mr. Sandberg's left heel bone was shattered, his left ankle was broken, and the 
cartilage in his right knee was destroyed. (Sandberg Depo. at 54-56, R. 848.) Mr. 
Sandberg has undergone no less than five surgeries to treat the injuries he sustained that 
day, including one procedure in which the ends of his toes were cut off and steel rods 
inserted into his toes, and he will require a knee replacement in the future. (Sandberg 
Depo. at 54-57, R. 848-49.) 
B. The Construction and Operation of the Facility. 
The Salt Lake Valley Solid Waste Management Council (the Council), the gov-
erning body that operates the Landfill and the Facility, was created in 1980 pursuant to 
an Interlocal Cooperation Agreement between Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County. 
(Interlocal Cooperation Agreement, R. 162-70.) The Council was made up of five 
members, including officials from the City and the County. (Agreement 1 2, R. 163.) 
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The Council was expressly directed to "plan, establish, and approve all construction 
and expansion projects for solid waste processing and disposal operations." (Agree-
ment t 8(D), R. 165.) The Council was further directed to "determine broad matters 
of policy" regarding the operation and management of waste disposal facilities, includ-
ing "[r]eview[ing] and establish[ing] policy on all operations or activities that are major 
in nature and require policy determinations." (Agreement t l 8(E), 8(E)(7), R. 165.) 
In the late 1980s, the County Public Works Department commissioned reports 
that recommended that a separate citizens' unloading/transfer station be added to the 
existing facilities at the Landfill. (Affidavit of Bud Logan Stanford t 5, R. 195.)2 In 
March 1990, the County Public Works Department formally recommended that such a 
facility be built. (Id 1 6.) The engineering department of the Salt Lake City Public 
Works Department was therefore hired to design the facility; Paul Jara, a civil 
engineer, was in charge of the design. (IcL t l 11-12, R. 196.) Mr. Jara prepared a 
Design Report and other plans and diagrams based on his review of other facilities, 
consultation with an outside engineering firm (EMCON), and other factors. (Design 
Report, R. 632-768.) 
The decision to build the Facility with a narrow sidewalk and with no chain or 
safety barrier along the edge of the open concrete pit was made primarily by Mr. Jara, 
the engineer working for the City, and Mr. Bud Stanford, who worked for the County 
Public Works Department, with no review or consideration by their superiors or other 
2
 Among other things, the purpose of the citizens' unloading facility was to allow 
private citizens to dump their refuse at a different location than commercial haulers. 
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governmental bodies. Plans for the Facility were circulated and reviewed by various 
governmental and private actors, but these plans did not address whether chains or 
other safety barriers would be installed along the edge of the open concrete pit, nor did 
they specify how wide the sidewalk separating the pit from the driving surface would 
be. (See, e.g.. Design Report, R. 632-768.) Nor did the plans discuss the pros and 
cons of sidewalk widths or safety barriers. (See id.) Even the diagrams of the pit wall 
included within the Design Report did not address sidewalk width or the existence or 
nonexistence of safety barriers. (See id at R. 644-73.) To the contrary, the prelim-
inary sketch of the Facility that was circulated to the review agencies appeared to show 
a wall along the edge of the pit. (Facility Diagram, R. 643, Add. Ex. 3.) 
Similarly, plans for the Facility were discussed at review meetings, but neither 
safety chains nor sidewalk widths were addressed, neither the County Public Works 
Department nor the Council asked about such safety features, and no decision was 
made by the Public Works Department or the Council to omit such protective features. 
(See Stanford Depo., R. 936, 938-40, 953.) Instead, the matter was discussed once, in 
an informal conversation in the lunchroom after a meeting. Mr. Stanford later testified 
that these issues were "minute to minute details" with which the Landfill Council did 
not concern itself: 
A. . . . They [the Landfill Council] don't like to get into the 
minute to minute details. They leave that to us. 
Q. Was this a minute to minute detail? 
A. These railings are, yeah. Something they don't get involved with. 
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(Stanford Depo., R. 942 (emphasis added).) 
There was also no Council review of or involvement in the decision to widen the 
sidewalks and install the safety chain after Mr. Sandberg and the three other persons 
were injured in the spring and summer of 1996. In fact, the City was not involved in 
that decision at all. Instead, Mr. Stanford, the operations manager at the Landfill, tes-
tified that "[w]e just did that on our own." (Stanford Depo., R. 941, 951-52.) 
C. The Litigation Against the City and the County. 
In April 1996, Mr. Sandberg retained Gordon Jensen, of the Defendant law firm 
to represent him in obtaining compensation for his injuries. (Complaint % 2, R. 1-2; 
Sandberg Depo. at 96-100, R. 859-60.) Mr. Jensen filed a timely notice of claim on 
Mr. Sandberg's behalf with Salt Lake County, and when that claim was denied Mr. 
Jensen filed a complaint in Third District Court. (Complaint t 4, R. 2; Sandberg 
Depo. at 103, R. 860.) Unfortunately, Mr. Jensen never filed a notice of claim with 
Salt Lake City, even though the City designed the Facility and co-owned and co-man-
aged the Landfill with the County. (Complaint 11 5, 7, R. 2-3.) 
Subsequently, Mr. Jensen died, and in the spring of 1999 Mr. Sandberg retained 
Anderson & Karrenberg to continue the representation. (Complaint t 6, R. 2-3.) In 
August 1999, Anderson & Karrenberg filed a notice of claim with Salt Lake City, 
which was denied, and added the City as a defendant in the then-pending lawsuit 
against the County. (Id.) The claim against the City was dismissed with prejudice, 
however, for Mr. Sandberg's failure to comply with the notice of claim requirements of 
the Governmental Immunity Act. (Id.) In September 2000, Mr. Sandberg settled his 
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claim against the County for $100,000. (IcL if 7, R. 3.) This amount represents less 
than half of the damages Mr. Sandberg sustained from his injuries, but Mr. Sandberg 
accepted the settlement because the County was seeking an allocation of fault to the 
City, which had designed and co-owned the Facility, and more than fifty percent of the 
fault would have likely been attributed to the City. Q± W 7-9, R. 3.) Thus, Mr. 
Sandberg is still substantially uncompensated for the injuries he sustained as a result of 
the City's negligent design and operation of the Facility. (Id^ 1f1 8-9, R. 3.) 
D. The Summary Judgment Proceedings Below. 
Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that even if Defendant had 
acted negligently in failing to timely file a notice of claim with the City, such neg-
ligence did not proximately cause Mr. Sandberg any injury because the claim would 
have been barred under the discretionary function exception to the waivers of immunity 
included in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.3 (See generally Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Memo."), R. 127-60.) To 
support its motion, Defendant submitted copies of the studies that had been done 
addressing the need for the Facility, Mr. Jara's Design Report and Calculations, and a 
report from EMCON, the outside engineering consulting firm that had been engaged to 
review the plans. (R. 162-92, 200-788.) Defendant also included correspondence and 
meeting minutes showing discussions of the Facility by various government and private 
3
 Defendant also contended that the City had no duty to remove the ice that had 
accumulated on the sidewalk along the unguarded edge of the pit, and that Mr. Sand-
berg's claim against the City would have been limited to a maximum of $150,000 under 
the Act's damages cap. The trial court did not rule on these issues. 
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agencies. (R. 789-831.) Additionally, Defendant submitted affidavits and deposition 
testimony from Mr. Jara, Mr. Stanford, and Mr. Richard Haughey, the EMCON 
representative. (R. 194-98, 595-604, 790-92.) 
Opposing the motion, Mr. Sandberg pointed out that in the hundreds of pages of 
studies, plans, reports, and correspondence, there was no discussion whatsoever of 
whether the Facility would have a chain or other safety features along the edge of the 
pit, or how wide the sidewalks would be, or the pros or cons of such safety features. 
(Oppo. Mem., R. 895-905.) Mr. Sandberg also explained that the existence or non-
existence of safety features for users of the Facility was not discussed at any of the 
meetings in which the plans were reviewed, other than the conversation "sitting around 
having a donut after the meeting, something like that." (See Stanford Depo., R. 953.) 
Mr. Sandberg also noted that EMCON was not hired to review the proposed Facility's 
"safety features," but only the "traffic patterns and necessary safety features for veh-
icles entering, unloading, and then leaving the transfer station area." (City-EMCON 
Contract % B, R. 772 (emphasis added).) Mr. Sandberg further pointed out that in fact, 
EMCON did not conduct a "detailed design review" of the Facility. (Id.) 
Mr. Sandberg further argued that the discretionary function exception did not bar 
his claim against the City because (1) the decisions at issue, i.e., building and operating 
a facility with no safety barriers along the open pit and dangerously narrow sidewalks, 
were not essential to the realization of a basic governmental policy, and (2) the 
decisions were not the result of a basic policy evaluation at the immunized policy-
making governmental level. (Oppo. Mem., R. 905-14.) Mr. Sandberg relied exten-
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sively on Truiillo v. UDOT. 1999 UT App 227, 986 P.2d 752, in which the Utah 
Court of Appeals held that the discretionary function exception did not immunize 
UDOT's decision to use barrels instead of concrete barriers to separate oncoming 
traffic during a highway project. 
Mr. Sandberg also asserted that even if the discretionary function exception 
applied to his claim, then the Act would violate the Utah Constitution, in particular the 
Open Courts provision. (Oppo. Mem., R. 914-17.) Mr. Sandberg explained that the 
City was engaged in a proprietary function in operating the Landfill, as (1) such ser-
vices are commonly provided by private entities, and (2) just like a private entity, the 
City and County charged fees for using the Landfill, which were used to fully pay for 
the operation of the Landfill. 
In reply, Defendant argued that because the omission of safety barriers and the 
narrow sidewalks were part of the design of the Facility, they qualify as policy dec-
isions entitled to protection under the Act. (See generally Reply Memorandum in Sup-
port of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Reply Memo."), R. 1011-29.) 
Defendant further asserted that Mr. Jara had consciously weighed the pros and cons of 
the safety features at issue, and that his decisions were entitled to protection because the 
City had delegated to him the responsibility for making those decisions. Defendant did 
not really respond to Mr. Sandbergfs constitutional argument, arguing instead that be-
cause the Act defines "governmental function" very broadly, operating the Landfill 
constitutes a governmental function under the Act even if it could be performed by pri-
11 
vate entities, so the discretionary function exception applies. (See Reply Memo., R. 
1022-25.) 
The trial court held that the discretionary function exception barred Mr. Sand-
berg's claim against the City, and as such he could not prove that he suffered any 
damages due to Defendant's failure to pursue that claim. (See Hearing Tr., R. 1083, at 
66-67, Addendum Exhibit 2.) The trial court essentially reasoned that the City had del-
egated to Mr. Jara the responsibility of designing the Facility, and Mr. Jara's decisions 
were therefore entitled to immunity. (IcL at 51-53.) The court also refused to hold the 
application of the Act unconstitutional in the present case, even though the court agreed 
that operation of the Landfill was a proprietary function, not a core governmental 
function, under the traditional test. (Id at 66-67.) 
This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's order granting summary judgment and dismissing Mr. Sand-
berg's legal malpractice claim against Defendant should be reversed. The court erred 
in holding that Mr. Sandberg's claim against the City would have been barred by the 
Act's discretionary function exception. Utah law establishes that the discretionary 
function exception does not apply to every governmental decision involving the exercise 
of discretion; instead, the exception is limited to "broad policy decisions" requiring 
evaluation of "basic governmental policy." The decisions at issue in the present case -
how wide the sidewalk should be and whether a safety chain should be put up along the 
12 
edge of an open pit — simply do not fundamental policies and are not entitled to the 
protection of the discretionary function exception. 
Utah case law holds that a governmental decision does not qualify for the dis-
cretionary function exception unless (a) the decision is essential to the realization of a 
basic governmental policy or objective, as opposed to a decision that would not change 
the course of that policy, and (b) the decision is the product of basic policy evaluation 
conducted at the "immunized policymaking level." Neither element is met here. First, 
as alluded to above, decisions as to how wide to make a sidewalk and whether to put up 
a chain are simply not essential to the realization of any basic governmental policy or 
objective. Instead, they are purely matters of customer convenience, which do not 
affect the course of the governmental policy at issue in the present case, namely, to 
facilitate the disposal of household waste. Indeed, that the sidewalk was widened and 
safety chains installed after Mr. Sandberg's injury demonstrates that these matters have 
little or no bearing on the Facility's primary purpose. 
Attempting to avoid this fatal defect in its case, Defendant argues that because 
the narrow sidewalk and omission of the safety chain were part of the Facility's original 
design, those issues necessarily constitute fundamental policy matters. This is non-
sense. The City's negligence goes beyond merely designing a building with inadequate 
safety features. Mr. Sandberg's claim against the City is for maintaining a dangerous 
building on the day he was injured, which includes not only building the Facility but 
also failing to correct the defects in the five years before Mr. Sandberg was hurt, even 
though a dozen people were injured there. Moreover, Utah authority rejects Defen-
13 
dant's argument and holds that in determining whether the discretionary function 
exception applies, the proper focus is on the actual decision that led to the injury, not 
on the overall plan or "design" encompassing that decision. Thus, that the dangerous 
conditions were part of the Facility's original design does not mean that basic policy 
matters are involved. 
Discretionary function immunity is also improper because Defendant did not 
establish that a conscious weighing of the pros and cons of omitting the pertinent safety 
features took place at the immunized policymaking level. Defendant submitted hun-
dreds of pages of studies, plans, and correspondence regarding the construction of the 
Facility, but there is no discussion whatsoever about what safety features the Facility 
would or would not have or why those features should or should not be included. Def-
endant argues that the decisions were made by an engineer in the City's Public Works 
Department, who was "delegated" the responsibility for designing the Facility, but this 
actually defeats discretionary function immunity. Utah law is clear that if a decision is 
considered only by a lower level, non-policymaking employee, then the decision is not 
entitled to protection under the Act. Moreover, even if the City were entitled to 
immunity for the decisions the engineer made in designing the Facility, that still would 
not immunize the City from its failure to correct the safety defects once users started 
falling into the pit, and there is no evidence that anyone from the City consciously 
reviewed whether to improve the Facility's safety features after the Facility was built. 
Thus, discretionary function immunity simply does not apply. 
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Further, even if the Governmental Immunity Act were to be interpreted to bar 
Mr. Sandberg's claim against the City, such an interpretation would violate the Open 
Courts provision of the Utah Constitution. Operation of the Landfill is a proprietary 
function, not a governmental function, and as such Mr. Sandberg would have had a 
right to compensation for his injuries under the common law. Thus, the Governmental 
Immunity Act, if interpreted to bar his claim, would deprive Mr. Sandberg of a com-
mon law right of recovery. And because the Act gives Mr. Sandberg no alternative 
remedy and the deprivation of his rights is not necessary to fight a clear social or 
economic evil, such a deprivation would violate the Open Courts provision. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING MR. SANDBERG'S 
MALPRACTICE CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
Mr. Sandberg initiated this malpractice action against Defendant for Defendant's 
negligent failure to pursue a claim against Salt Lake City for his injuries. The trial 
court dismissed Mr. Sandberg's claim on the ground that Mr. Sandberg purportedly 
would be unable to show that Defendant's failure to bring a claim against the City 
proximately caused him any injury, as any claim against the City would have been 
barred by the "discretionary function" exception of the Governmental Immunity Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1).4 The judgment should be reversed. 
4
 Technically, the discretionary function doctrine operates as an exception to the 
Governmental Immunity Act's broad waivers of immunity. Mr. Sandberg's claim 
against the City should have been brought under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-9, in which 
"immunity from suit for all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused from 
a dangerous or defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or 
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A. The trial court erred in holding that Mr. Sandbergfs claims against the City 
would have been barred by the discretionary function exception. 
The Governmental Immunity Act provides a limited immunity to governmental 
entities for injuries arising out of the exercise of discretionary functions: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee com-
mitted within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, 
in connection with, or results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or per-
form a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (emphasis added). Discretionary function immunity "was 
not designed to cloak the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity in modern garb." 
Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1996). Instead, it is a "distinct, 
more limited form of immunity that should be applied only when a plaintiff is challen-
ging a governmental decision that involves a basic policy-making function." IcL (em-
phasis added). Accordingly, "[n]ot every governmental action involving discretion is a 
discretionary function within the meaning of the Act." Truullo v. Utah Dep't of 
Trans.. 1999 UT App 227, 121, 986 P.2d 752. Instead, discretionary function 
immunity is "limited to broad policy decisions 'requiring evaluation of basic govern-
mental policy matters, not operational and ministerial acts." Healthcare Services, Inc. 
v. Utah Dep't of Health. 2002 UT 5, 1 28, 40 P.3d 591 (emphasis added) (quoting 
Hansen v. Salt Lake County. 794 P.2d 838, 846 (Utah 1990)). 
other public improvement," unless one of the exceptions set forth in § 63-30-10 
applied. As set forth in the text, the discretionary function exception is included within 
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For the discretionary function exception to apply, the governmental entity must 
establish that the act in question satisfies each of the following criteria: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a 
basic governmental policy, program, or objective? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization 
or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to one 
which would not change the course or direction of the policy, program, or 
objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of basic 
policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental 
agency involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite con-
stitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the chal-
lenged act, omission, or decision? 
Price v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 2000 UT App 333, 1 38, 14 P.3d 702 (em-
phasis addodi iqiioliiig Xrujillo If 2 7). 
Additionally, because this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, def-
endants face an even steeper burden. Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sum-
TIKI .,...• establishes " | l | thai llieic1 is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and [2] that the moving paity is entitled to jiicig 
ment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). For summary judgment to be pro-
pot 11 if "ivn in^ part \ umsl SUIMIIII ,«"il(k iciil ''VKICMU "M niherwise establish its I ight to 
judgment. The moving party has an "affirmative burden," Lamb v. B & B Amuse-
ments Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1993), and if the movant fails to demonstrate 
that i 10 gem ill le issue of n latei ial fact exists. tl le it :i lotioi l mi ist 'be denied. E.g., Badger 
§ 63-30-10. 
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v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752 (Utah 1996) (because moving party's aff-
idavit failed to negate existence of disputed issue of fact, nonmoving party had no bur-
den to present evidence in response on that issue). 
Defendant failed to satisfy the strict requirements of the discretionary function 
exception. In particular, Defendant failed to establish that the omission of safety 
features along the edge of the pit was essential to the realization of a basic govern-
mental policy, program, or objective. Ct Healthcare Services. 2002 UT 5, t 28, 40 
P.3d 591. Further, Defendant failed to present evidence establishing that a policy-
making governmental body consciously weighed the risks and benefits of omitting the 
safety features at issue. At the very least, significant issues of fact exist, rendering 
summary judgment inappropriate. 
1. Defendant failed to establish that the decisions to have a six-foot 
sidewalk and to omit a safety chain were "essential to the real-
ization" of a basic governmental objective. 
a. Decisions such as whether to have safety chains or 
how wide a sidewalk should be would not change the 
course of the governmental policies furthered by the 
operation of the Landfill and the Facility. 
To establish that Mr. Sandberg's claim against the City would have been barred 
under the discretionary function exception, Defendant was required to show that as a 
matter of law omitting a safety chain and keeping a narrow sidewalk were both essen-
tial to accomplishing a basic governmental objective: 
Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or 
accomplishment of that [basic governmental] policy, program, or objec-
tive as opposed to one which would not change the course or direction of 
the policy, program, or objective! 
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Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624 (quotation omitted). Defendant 's claim fails because it is 
patei itl> ofr ioi is that omitting the safety features at issue was not essential to accom-
plishing any basic governmental goal. Instead, the decisions regarding wl lethei to have 
a chain, or how wide the sidewalk should be are both decisions "which would not 
change: the coi irse oi directum- i the policy, program, or objective." 
In its opening memorandum below, Defendai it posited tl lat tl ite govei i n i lental 
policy at issue was "the disposition of public waste in a safe, environmentally sensitive 
manne r that is convenient for citizens." (Defendant 's M e m o . . ^ *A'" Defendant 
presented no evidence, however *•<• t iev-
ing this goal, nor did Defendant present evidence that a narrow sidewalk was similarly 
esse .... -.^  a party seeking summary judgment must show that it is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, Defendant's failure lo <ii ninnsti ,ite flu1 mpmianu ' ul fliese 
conditions requires that the judgment be reversed. 
In fact. I he evidence establishes that the omission of adequate safety features was 
not essential to achieving the polic\ oi mosuiim1 lm llir s.itc nul c n m r n i r n i disposition 
of public waste, because the defects were corrected years ago and there is no evidence 
that ihi "  c hanges have prevented the fulfillment of the policy since then. Tn ' W 6 . after 
Mr. Sandberg 's accident (and after three otl lei peop le fell ii ito the • j m i, i i ,iia m was 
installed and the sidewalk was widened to nine feet. (Stanford Depo . , R. 948.) Deien-
dant cited absolutely no evidence that these safety enhancements prevented the achieve-
ment of the Facil i ty 's purpose. In fact, rvci since* M>% lint1 F a n l i h lias been com-
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mitted to keeping the safety chain in place, despite customer complaints. (See id. at R. 
949 ("Q: Is there any consideration now to removing the chain? . . . [1] A: "No. 
No. There is no consideration at that at all.").) If not having a safety chain were 
essential to the Facility's purposes, it is highly doubtful that the Facility would have 
kept the safety chain in place since 1996. 
b. The decisions are not essential to realizing a basic 
governmental policy simply because they were part of 
the original designs for the Facility. 
Notably, Defendant did not even attempt to argue below that building and keep-
ing a narrow sidewalk and omitting a safety chain were essential to realizing a govern-
mental objective. Instead, Defendant claimed that because these issues were "two of 
thousands of specific features of the overall design," they were automatically immun-
ized by the discretionary function exception: "As part of the design, it is part of the 
policy making function." (Reply Memo., R. 1014-15.) Defendant further argued that 
"it is hard to imagine how the objective could have been accomplished at all without the 
design." (Defendant's Memo., R. 146.) 
Defendant's "it's part of the design" argument misses the point for several rea-
sons. First, Mr. Sandberg's claim is not based simply on the "design" of the Facility. 
Mr. Sandberg was injured because there was no safety chain when he used the Facility 
on March 25, 1996, and because the sidewalk was only six feet wide that day. Thus, 
Mr. Sandberg's injury resulted not only from the original construction of the Facility, 
but also from the City's failure to add a chain or sufficiently widen the sidewalk after 
the Facility was built. 
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Second, Defendant proffered no authority below for the proposition ma. u des-
ign building or project inherently involves basic policy decisions T-* tlv. v ontrary, 
the Utah Supreme Courl appears lo lt,;i\c re wctcd DekMuliwl's argument. 5ee Andrus 
v. State, 541 P. 2d \ I ?ah 1^5). In Andrus, the design for the construction of the 
East Ski--- o . ,£ ..,.,.. to provide for storm water drainage, and the plaintiffs' 
property flooded. The St,.:, • -•• ihsuHion.m ( inclioii exception. W the 
supreme court rejected that argument, reasoning that "[t]he decision to build t 
way and specifying its general location were discretionary functions, but the preparing 
of plans and specifications and (he Mipei'viMon o) ilu mmm i in wiaiii die \u>rk was 
carried out cannot be labeled discretionary functions." I<L at 1120 (emphasis added). 
Third, even if an overall "design" were considered a matter of basic governmen-
tal policy, that i easoi ring "\A ro\ ilci it lot c: 'Xtei id tc • e\ ei y sii lgle aspect of that design. In-
stead, Utah authority establishes that in addressing a claim of discretionary ftiiictioli 
immunity, a court must focus on the particular decision that led to the plaintiff's injury. 
For exampL lrujillo, a i a\e lenorkabh sinnlai i nu1 one ai ki i , this rouri held 
that discretionary function immunity did not relieve UDOT of liability for mjuiies nf-
fered as a result of an unsafe traffic control plan implemented as part of the I ^ -
struction project in Weber CWAW-/ '.rajiUo. !l>°(| ! , l \\*y l!1 " ^ i -'-,», o 2 . 5 
While one side of the freeway was being rebuilt, traffic was routed onto the opposite 
side, requiring a 'two-lane two-way operation." IcL € A TTDOT determined that 
plastic barrels instead of con ; J ^ opposing lanes 
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of traffic, and the plaintiffs were injured when an oncoming driver crossed through the 
barrels into their lane. 
The plaintiffs asserted that UDOT should have used concrete barriers to separate 
the lanes, but the trial court granted summary judgment for UDOT under the discre-
tionary function exception. This Court reversed. The Court recognized that the plan to 
use barrels for traffic separation was part of the overall plan for the entire 1-84 project. 
IdL 15. Nevertheless, in addressing the discretionary function exception, the Court 
focused on the particular decision that led to the injuries, i.e., the decision to use 
barrels instead of barriers. IdL fl 31-33. In fact, the Court held that while the decision 
to rebuild the freeway was an immune discretionary function, the choice to use the 
barrels for traffic separation was not a discretionary ftmction. The Court farther 
stressed that in considering the applicability of the discretionary function doctrine, 
"[a]negations that a governmental entity has been negligent must be separately exam-
ined to determine if each act complained of is an immunized discretionary ftmction or is 
merely an operational or ministerial implementation of an already-established policy." 
IcL % 23 (emphasis added). 
Earlier authority, too, defeats Defendant's argument that decisions concerning 
safety features constitute basic policy decisions simply because those decisions may be 
made in the course of executing a larger overall plan or design. For example, in 
Carroll v. State Road Commission, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888, 891-92 (1972), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that a road supervisor was not making a basic policy decision 
5
 A copy of Trujillo is attached as Addendum Exhibit 5. 
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when he decided to use berms as the sole means of warning drivers nm n.ni was 
washed out; instead, the supervisor was engaged in "the operational level of decision 
making " Sirnilai 1 \. in Andrus, .-. • .- s .ae s design ot :i highway 
project and storm system as part of a reconstruction project wore not disuriionarv 
functions. :~ both instances, as in Trujillo, the decisions at issue were encompassed 
v-: •-•:.- net's, I lit" courts IOCUSLX -^  decisions that 
actually led to the injur}. . . mo, tiiwic is no basis for Defendant - •;- - ni iini ihe 
focus of the discretionary function exception must be on the overall "design" of the 
Facility instead ol r r Hie lailuiv lo include adequate safety features both in the initial 
construction and after the Facility opened. 
Finally, Defendant's argument that every single detail within the overall "de 
sign" ''it I lie F-iCjhty constitute , a hioad policy matter is completely illogical, as shown 
by the following hypothetical. Suppose that engineering SIJIMLIHI1- I<M J ("if\ -nvned 
parking garage required the floors to be supported by posts at least two feet in dia-
mekM , hut I he < ""ly'"s engineers mistakenly designed one-foot support posts, and the 
floors collapsed. The width of support posts w( 
sands of features" of the overall design of the garage. Yet it would be ludicrous to 
argue tlui (In uin luni MI|>|><MI pish w\ IC "essential to the realization or accomplish-
ment of a basic governmental policy, program, or objective," CL Keegaiu 8% V M at 
624, simply because the posts were included in those plans. It is likewise ludicrous for 
Defendants to uit'tic thai (fie width o| a sidewalk, or the existence or nonexistence of a 
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chain, is likewise essential to the realization or accomplishment of a basic governmental 
policy. 
Accordingly, Defendants are wrong in claiming that "the design of the Facility" 
was essential to achieving the asserted policy of safe waste disposal, or that the policy 
could not have been achieved "without the design." A different design, e.g., one with 
chains and wider sidewalks, could have achieved the governmental policy (and have 
prevented Mr. Sandberg's injury). At any rate, the evidence certainly does not estab-
lish as a matter of law that decisions regarding the chain and the sidewalk width were 
essential to fulfill the purposes of the Facility. 
c. The policies behind the discretionary function 
immunity would not be furthered by holding that the 
decisions at issue in the present case constitute basic 
governmental policy decisions. 
The discretionary function exception, like governmental immunity in general, 
denies compensation to persons who have been injured as a result of another's neg-
ligence. The discretionary function exception is ordinarily justified, however, by the 
countervailing public policy notion that a government must be allowed to govern and 
that governing necessarily involves making policy decisions that should not be second-
guessed by courts or individual litigants. As the court explained in Keegan, discre-
tionary function immunity is designed "to shield those governmental acts and decisions 
impacting on large numbers of persons in a myriad of unforeseen ways from individual 
and class legal actions, the continual threat of which would make public administration 
all but impossible." Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623 (quotation and internal punctuation 
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omitted). The so-called "policies" furthered by the City's omission of saleh leaturTS 
around the edge of the pit, however, do not involve "governmental" policies at all; they 
an; puni.irily inuttns oi customer convenience. Thus, there is nothing "governmental" 
about the decisions made regarding the safety features. In fail ihese decisions arc 
made by private businesses every day, and courts are perfectly competent to determine 
if soi.ii divisions vu'tr uiifcasoiubk: ami lo award compensation where appropriate. 
In other words, the decisions at issue in the nreseni ruse am ml i i oiiipieiciv 
different nature than decisions like the one in Keegan, which involved whether to en-
gage • -ient involving delays a inconvenience to every 
motorist who traveled down Parleys Canyon. CX Keegan.. - ^ V 
the-mill matters like whether to put up a chain or whethei ., sidewalk should be nine 
feet \\u\r ratlin iiiam u luxi simplv \uii noi "impact[] large numbers of persons in a 
myriad of unforeseen ways." The bottom lint is dial I In* IIIM retioiwn, function i/vivp 
tion is not intended to protect mundane decisions like the ones at issue in the present 
case, Sandberg's claim would be a gross injustice. Defen-
dant therefore cannot show that Mr. Sandber : <• •• , bv 
governmental immunity. 
2. Defendant failed to establish that the decisions at issue required the 
actual exercise of basic policy evaluation at the immunized policy-
making level. 
Additionally, Defendant failed to present evidence below establishing that the 
dec is; sidewalk and omit safety chains resulted from "the exercise 
of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise n Hie part ol ilie goveminenlul 
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agency involved." Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624. To meet this element, Defendant must 
show that the decisions regarding the sidewalk and safety chains were "the result of ser-
ious and extensive policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise," and that a "conscious 
balancing of risks and advantages took place" at the "immunized policy-making level." 
Tnijillo. 1999 UT App 227, 11 27, 33, 986 P.2d 752; Little v. Utah State Div. of Fam-
ily Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983). 
a. No one acting at a policy-making level considered 
whether to omit the safety features at issue in this 
case. 
In Trujillo, this Court held that discretionary function immunity was not avail-
able to UDOT because UDOT failed to present evidence that the issue of whether to 
use barrels or concrete barriers for traffic separation was discussed at the immunized 
policy-making level. The Court noted that plans for the entire reconstruction project 
underwent extensive review: 
Plans for the entire 1-84 project were drafted, formulated, and approved 
in a series of meetings and reviews over the course of approximately one 
year. Participants included Federal Highway Administration represen-
tatives; UDOT maintenance, engineering, design, and administrative per-
sonnel; and several city and county officials. 
Trujillo, 1999 UT App 227, 1 5, 986 P.2d 752. The court also noted, however, that 
"the record contains no evidence that the traffic control plan was ever specifically 
singled out for discussion, review, or approval at any point in the approval process." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The Court thus held that the discretionary function exception did not immunize 
UDOT's decision to separate traffic with barrels, even though both the project design 
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engineer and UDOT's Region One Design Engineer had engaged it i discussions 
weighing the traffic separation options. The Court's reasoning is instructive: 
In this appeal, on the other hand, it is undisputed that the traffic 
control plan was formulated by an unlicensed UDOT staff engineer - an 
employee who did not perform at the policy-making level. Further, while 
the record on appeal contains a general description of the multi-level 
approval process for plans and specifications pertaining to the 1-84 
resurfacing project, UDOTfs evidence does no more than establish that 
the traffic control plan could have been discussed in those meetings. 
UDOT does not point us to evidence that the traffic control plan and 
the barrels-versus-barriers decision was in fact the subject of intense 
scrutiny and review. IJDOT now characterizes the decision to use 
barrels as a "tough choice" between two traffic separation methods and 
now draws our attention to the relative risks and benefits of barrels and 
barriers. However, UDOT's evidence shows these issues were add-
ressed only in private discussions between the project design engineer 
who drafted the traffic control plan and UDOTfs Region One Design 
Engineer. These facts are insufficient to bring the formulation of the 
traffic control plan within the scope of discretionary function immunity. 
Id. 1| 31 "i italics in *ii igttiitl,, I nkl initial i 
In holding discretionary immunity inapplicable, the Trujillo court distil iguished 
Keegan, in which the Utah Supreme Court held that discretionary immunity protected 
UDOT'^  decision n<ii "« "cpLiu: ntetluii harriers on 1 80' in Parley's Canyon that vio 
lated relevant safety standards. Keegan, 896 P.2d 618. Ilie barrier s in Keegan orig-
inally complied with the standards, but two overlay projects raised the road level, 
effectively redw. iiij; \\w \wv*\\\ •! 11 • i I >:n i ici iiiul NIL1 plaintiff s husband was killed 
when his car climbed the barrier and slid into a bridge support. The Trujjjju mini 
pointed out that in Keegan, UDOT had gone through a detailed process in deciding not 
to raise tl le ban iei , ii icli icili lg a creatii lg a safety study thai ' comprehensive[ly]" an-
alyzed accident rates and a "cost-benefit report" that addressed nuuKToih " ignitiianl 
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factors such as the cost, the fact that the highway was to be redone in a few years any-
way, the delays and inconvenience of an additional construction project, etc. Trujillo 
t 30 (citing Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624). The study and report were compiled by senior 
engineers and circulated and debated throughout UDOT. IcL Trujillo noted that the 
decision not to raise the barriers in Keegan "'involved just the sort of policy-driven 
weighing of costs and benefits that the discretionary function exception was meant to 
protect.'" IcL 
The case at bar is exactly on all fours with Trujillo. As in Trujillo, "the record 
contains no evidence that the [omission of safety measures] was ever specifically sin-
gled out for discussion, review, or approval at any point in the approval process." 
Trujillo t 5. To the contrary, the evidence shows that the omission of safety features 
was not singled out for attention. In fact, in the entire six-inch stack of reports and 
plans Defendant filed to support its summary judgment motion, there is barely a men-
tion of whether safety chains would be installed or how wide the sidewalks would be, 
and there appears to be no discussion of the costs and benefits of safety chains or 
sidewalk widths. Similarly, the safety features at issue were not considered at review 
meetings with the Public Works Department or the Council, and no decision was made 
by the Public Works Department or the Council to omit such features. 
Instead, as in Trujillo, these issues were addressed, considered, and resolved by 
a staff engineer, Paul Jara, and there is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Jara was res-
ponsible for making governmental policy decisions. Mr. Jara was employed by Salt 
Lake City's Public Works Department, which had 108 employees, of which approxim-
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ately ten to fifteen percent were engineers. (JaraDepo., R. 597.; Mr. I ant iqmitoil 10 
the "engineering administrator" of his department, who in turn reported to the Public 
Works DifTiilo] Mil I  :»WM)X 1 Mi ILILI icsfilinl (hat Public Works was only one 
of "many" different engineering departments in Salt Lake City powrnnuMii ild.) 
Thus, as in Trujillo, the issue of whether to install a chain or how wide the sidewalk 
shoi ilci 1: 1 w as discussed 01 ) lj b> ai 1 e mplo> ee "wl 10 did not perform, at the policy-
making level." Trujillo If 31.6 
That the Council never discussed the matters upon which Mr. Sandberg's claim 
agaj, • I'II , \ nilil h;i\r been based is fatal 10 Defendant's discretionary function 
argument, because it was the Council's role to "determine bi oad matters of polic> reg-
arding the operation and management of any solid waste processing and disposal facil-
ities." i liik'i iMiiiL.i! 1 "oopeiatiuii Agreement, > ^art of this function, the 
Council was specifically directed to "[r]eview an 1 establis 
activities that are major and nature and require policy determinations.
 vldj in oilier 
winds, the deasiom tit issue in the present case were not considered by the very body 
expressly charged with "determining] broad matters o1 polio " 
6
 Before the trial court, Defendant asserted that Mr. Jara was an "expert[] 
retained by these governmental bodies [the City and County] to make such decisions 
[concerning the sidewalks and safety chains]." (Reply Memo, at 6, R. 1016.) there is 
There is no indication, however, that Mr. Jara was any more of an "expert" than the 
engineer who designed the traffic control plan in Trujillo. Instead, like the engineer in 
Trujillo, Mr. Jara was an engineer already on the City's staff who happened to draw 
the assignment of designing the Facility. In fact, Mr. Jara had never designed a waste 
unloading facility prior to designing the one at issue in the present case. (Jara Depo., 
R 6030 
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b. The City cannot satisfy the "conscious weighing" 
requirement simply by "delegating" the decisions to a 
staff engineer. 
Recognizing that the Council did not address the Facility's lack of safety feat-
ures, Defendant instead argued (and the trial court ruled) that the Council did not need 
to discuss those matters, because those matters were left to Mr. Jara and Mr. Stanford 
to decide. This argument, however, directly contradicts Trujillo. In Trujillo. the issue 
of whether to use barriers or barrels to separate the traffic lanes was left to the staff 
engineer who designed the traffic control plan and the Region One Design Engineer 
with whom he discussed the matter. Trujillo, 1999 UT App 227 if 31, 986 P.2d 752. 
But the court held that because the decision was not made at the "immunized policy-
making level," the discretionary function exception did not apply. In other words, the 
fundamental principle to be derived from Trujillo is that if a decision can be left 
completely in the hands of a non-policymaking subordinate, then the decision is not 
entitled to the protection of the discretionary function exception. 
That reasoning applies with full force to the present case. The Council, charged 
with determining policy matters, did not deem the issue of safety features to be impor-
tant enough for the Council to be directly involved. As Mr. Stanford testified, "They 
[the Council] don't like to get into the minute to minute details," and chains and side-
walk widths were minute-to-minute details. (Stanford Depo., R. 942.) If the Council 
itself determined that the safety features were not important enough for the Council to 
be directly involved, then those decisions are not important enough to qualify under the 
discretionary function exception. 
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If is also significant that there was no policy level review oi - o 
install safety chains and widen the sidewalks after Mr. Sandberg was injured. The 
Landfill Counul h.i I iintluii;/ l \U\ wii'li \\h)\v mailers; instead, "[w]e just did that on 
our own." (Stanford Depo., R. 937, 941, 951-52.) Once again, ii thr umssion uf 
safety chains and the narrow sidewalk resulted from extensive consideration by policy-
makuip govcinninKal niiiiit"\ m IM iiouhiim ifui iimse decisions could have been so 
easily overridden. Cj\ Trujillo 1 34 n.4. 
Just as in Trujillo, the decisions to omit safety chains and build a narrow side-
walk were mad*' .i! Ilii ln\\ l< u I riinnaTiiig kwl and everyone else went along with-
out independently addressing the issue. The omission of safety feature muv h;ive been 
included in the plans that were approved by policy-making bodies, but there is nothing 
to suggest lfi;i< Hi use issues viae sing led out ; i nd specifically considered by the respon-
sible parties. Accordingly, discretionary function immumiv » unplv dues nut .ipplv. 
c Even if Mr. Jara were acting in a policymaking 
position, summary judgment was still inappropriate 
because he did not consciously consider all of the acts 
and omissions that led to Mr. Sandberg1 s injury. 
Moreover, even if the City were entitled to discretionary function immunity for 
decisions actually made by Mr. Jara, Mr. Sandberg still would have a claim against the 
City, because there is no evidence III I M1 '.if > 'luih ,m\ onsurv, decisions con-
cerning safety at the Facility after it was built. Once again, Mr. Sandberg was not in-
jured because the Facility was unreasonably dangerous when it opened; he was injured 
because the Facility was uniVrisonahK ilaiigeimis i»n \ltin it \ lwt\ i he unreason-
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ably dangerous condition that led to Mr. Sandberg's injury resulted not only from the 
inadequate safety features in the original design, but also from the failure to add such 
safety features during the five years after the Facility opened, even though the potential 
for injury was obvious (see Photographs, R. 931, Add. Ex. 4) and even though a dozen 
people had been injured falling into the pit. CH Trujillo 1 34 (independently addressing 
"the negligent acts UDOT allegedly committed after the traffic control plan was in eff-
ect in the construction zone" and holding that those allegations of negligence "involve 
operational decisions on the part of UDOT"). 
The record contains no evidence that Mr. Jara was involved at all in any dec-
isions regarding the Facility after it was built. (See Jara Aff. ^ 1-7, R. 1034-36; Jara 
Depo., R. 595-604.) Thus, because there is no evidence that the failure to improve the 
safety features after the initial construction was the result of a "conscious weighing of 
pros and cons," even by Mr. Jara, Mr. Sandberg still would have had a claim against 
the City. Or more appropriately, because this is an appeal from a grant of summary 
judgment, Defendant has not established that Mr. Sandberg would not have had a claim 
against the City. Thus, it was error for the trial court to dismiss Mr. Sandberg's entire 
claim against Defendant. 
B. Applying the Governmental Immunity Act to bar Mr, Sandbergfs claims 
against the City would have violated the Utah Constitution, as the City was 
engaged in a proprietary function in owning and operating the Landfill. 
Because the trial court erred in ruling that the discretionary function exception 
would have barred Mr. Sandberg's claim against Salt Lake City, Defendant's motion 
for summary judgment was improperly granted, and reversal is required. Reversal is 
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also required, however, because to the extent that the Governmental Immunity Act bars 
Mr. Sandberg's claim the Act violates article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, the Open Courts provision, states 
in pertinent part that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to 
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." 
Utah Const, art. I, § 11 (emphasis added). Under this provision, "an individual [may] 
not be arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to protect basic individual 
rights." Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, 
where the legislature passes a statute that deprives a person of a remedy that existed at 
common law, the deprivation violates the Open Courts Provision unless (a) the legis-
lative scheme provides an "effective and reasonable alternative remedy" for his injur-
ies, or (b) abrogation of Mr. Sandberg's remedy is justified by a "clear social or econ-
omic evil." Id at 680. In the present case, Mr. Sandberg has a common law right to 
recover compensation for his injuries because they resulted from the City's engagement 
in a proprietary function, not an essential governmental function. Further, Mr. Sand-
berg has no alternative remedy for his injuries, and abrogation of his remedy is not 
justified by a clear social or economic evil. 
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1. Denying Mr. Sandberg compensation for the injuries he sustained 
as a result of the City's negligent operation of the Facility would 
deprive Mr. Sandberg of rights existing at common law. 
a. Governmental immunity implicates a plaintiff's rights 
under the Open Courts provision unless the injury 
arises out of an essential governmental function. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established that governmental immunity implicates 
rights protected by the Open Courts provision unless the immunized activity was a true 
governmental function: an activity "of such a unique nature that it can only be per-
formed by a governmental agency" or an activity that is "essential to the core of gov-
ernmental activity." See DeBrv v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 440 (Utah 1995). If the 
activity at issue could just as easily be performed by a private entity, then the activity is 
considered "proprietary," for which a remedy existed under the common law, and ab-
rogating the remedy by the Governmental Immunity Act would violate the Open Courts 
provision unless the abrogation were justified. 
The "essential to the core of a governmental activity" test adopted in DeBrv was 
originally formulated in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1236-37 
(Utah 1980), which addressed the interpretation of the Governmental Immunity Act as 
it existed at the time. At that time, the Act provided governmental immunity only for 
the exercise of a "governmental function" but did not define what constituted such a 
function. In 1987, the legislature amended the Act to state that anything a govern-
mental entity did was considered a "governmental function" for purposes of the Act. 
In DeBrv, however, the Utah Supreme Court held that the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity was limited by the Open Courts provision. The court recognized that while 
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Standiford was not interpreting the state constitution, the test derived in that case "drew 
a line between article I, section 11 interests and governmental immunity in a manner 
consistent with the underlying concept of governmental immunity as it existed at state-
hood. " DeBry, 889 P.2d at 440. Accordingly, the court held that the Standiford test is 
the starting point for determining whether a particular application of sovereign immun-
ity complies with article I, section 11. The court cautioned, however, that legislative 
determinations must be afforded a presumption of constitutionality. IcL The court fur-
ther explained that "in applying the Standiford test, the Court must, among other 
things, evaluate whether the effect of tort liability would promote public safety or de-
feat essential or core governmental activities and programs that are critical to the pro-
tection of public safety and welfare." Id, (footnotes omitted). 
b. The City's construction and operation of the Facility 
was not an essential governmental function. 
Under the Standiford test, which is now the starting point for the constitutional 
analysis, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the maintenance and operation of a 
municipal sewer system was not a governmental function because such functions could 
also be provided by private parties. Thomas v. Clearfield City. 642 P.2d 737, 739 
(Utah 1982). The court reasoned that "[e]ven assuming that the collection and disposal 
of sewage is most effectively, safely, and inexpensively performed by a governmental 
body, we do not agree that these functions are uniquely governmental or essential to the 
core of its activity." IcL (emphasis added). The court expressly rejected the city's 
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argument that operation of a sewer was a core governmental function even though stat-
utes authorized cities to provide sewer systems and enforce mandatory hookups. 
As with the collection and disposal of municipal sewage, the collection and dis-
posal of municipal garbage cannot be considered a uniquely governmental function nor 
a function essential to the core of governmental activity. Just as in Thomas, the Utah 
Code authorizes, but does not require, municipalities to provide solid waste man-
agement services: 
Subject to the powers and rules of the department, the governing 
body of each public entity may: 
(1) supervise and regulate the collection, transportation, and 
disposition of all solid waste generated within its jurisdiction; [and] 
(2) provide solid waste management facilities to handle ade-
quately solid waste generated or existing without or without its juris-
diction . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-503 (emphasis added). 
Significantly, solid waste disposal services can and often are provided by private 
entities. According to Mr. Stanford, between 10 and 20 percent of municipal solid 
waste landfills are privately operated, and the trend has been that the number of private 
landfills is increasing while the number of publicly owned landfills is decreasing sharp-
ly. (See Stanford Depo., R. 943-44, 962-63.) The Environmental Protection Agency 
likewise reports that as of approximately 1992, private landfills accounted for more 
than half of the landfill market segment. (Environmental Protection Agency, Report to 
Congress: Flow Controls and Municipal Solid Waste, EPA Doc. 530-R-95-008, R. 
982, 988.) 
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Utah law expressly authorizes the disposal of solid waste by private parties. The 
Utah Code states that any "person" may "own, construct, modify, or operate any fac-
ility or site for the purpose of disposing of nonhazardous solid waste" if approval for 
the facility is received. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-108(3)(a). And in 1975, the Utah 
Supreme Court struck down a local ordinance that prohibited private parties from col-
lecting or disposing of trash on a commercial basis. Parker v. Provo City Corp., 543 
P.2d 769 (Utah 1975). Indeed, in 1988 the Landfill Council even considered privat-
izing its operation. (Landfill Evaluation and Privatization Study, R. 211-305.) 
In other words, as designer, owner, and operator of the Landfill, Salt Lake City 
acts in a proprietary capacity, just like a private entity. Just like a private entity, the 
Landfill is not supported by tax revenues; instead, the Landfill charges fees to fund its 
operation and is designed to be (and is) financially self-sufficient. (See Stanford Depo., 
R. 945-47 ("All of the money to operate everything here comes from fees that we 
collect from users.").) Thus, under the Standiford test, as modified and applied in 
DeBry, operating the Facility is not a governmental function, and interpreting the Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act to allow the City to escape liability for its negligence in des-
igning and operating the Facility would have deprived Mr. Sandberg of a right that 
existed at common law.7 
7
 The Utah Supreme Court has recently held that UTA's operation of a public 
transportation mstituted a governmental function under the traditional test, and as such 
application of the Act's damages cap did not violate the Open Courts provision. Parks 
v. UTA, 2002 UT 55, 449 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (June 14, 2002). The court stressed that 
the vast majority of UTA's revenues came from public financing, and that UTA "is not 
self-supporting and would not survive on income from its revenue-producing activ-
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Additionally, imposing tort liability on the City for its operation of the Landfill 
would certainly "promote public safety" and would not "defeat essential or core gov-
ernmental activities or programs that are critical to the protection of the public safety 
and welfare." DeBry, 889 P.2d at 440. Holding the City liable for its negligence in 
designing, building, and operating the Facility would promote public safety for the 
same reasons that holding any defendant liable for its negligence promotes public 
safety: Making the City responsible for the costs of injuries caused by its own neg-
ligence will give the City an incentive to prevent accidents in the first place. And there 
is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that holding the City liable for its operation of the 
Landfill would defeat any essential or core governmental programs. 
2. The deprivation of Mr. Sandberg's remedy for his injuries violates 
the Open Courts provision because no alternative remedy has been 
provided and such deprivation is not justified by a clear social evil. 
Accordingly, under the holding in DeBry, Mr. Sandberg's right to recover com-
pensation for the injuries he sustained as a result of the City's negligence in operating 
the Landfill is protected by article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution. Thus, for the 
deprivation of that right to be proper, the defendant must show that (a) the legislative 
scheme provides an "effective and reasonable alternative remedy" for his injuries, or 
ities." Id, 11 10-13. The Court further noted that UTA was statutorily prohibited 
from competing with private businesses. IdL 1 13. In contrast, the Landfill is self-
supporting, and there is nothing that prohibits the Landfill from competing with private 
companies for the solid waste disposal business. Thus, Parks does not affect Mr. 
Sandberg's argument that applying the Governmental Immunity Act to bar his claim 
would be unconstitutional. 
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(b) abrogation of Mr. Sandberg's remedy is justified by a "clear social or economic 
evil." Berry, 717 P.2d at 680 (Utah 1985). 
The Governmental Immunity Act does not provide Mr. Sandberg with any alter-
native remedy for his injuries. Instead, like the statute of repose found unconstitutional 
in Berry, 717 P.2d 670, the Act (if the discretionary function were to apply) simply 
bars Mr. Sandberg's claim. The Act is unlike workers' compensation or no-fault insur-
ance statutes, in which a right to a tort remedy is restricted in exchange for a right to 
recovery that is broader is scope but more limited in amount. Cf. Warren v. Melville, 
937 P.2d 556, 558-63 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding no-fault statute constitutional); 
Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining, and Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 
612 (1948) (holding workers' compensation statute constitutional). Instead, Mr. 
Sandberg is simply left out in the cold, with absolutely no compensation for medical 
expenses, lost income, lost earning capacity, or pain and suffering. 
Similarly, the record contains no evidence that abrogating Mr. Sandberg's right 
to compensation for his injuries is justified by any social or economic evil. Once again, 
because the City was in the same position as a private entity in building and operating 
the Facility, and because Mr. Sandberg's claim against the City is no different from an 
ordinary tort claim against a private business entity, it is difficult to imagine what evil 
could justify the complete abrogation of Mr. Sandberg's right to recover for the 
excruciating injuries he suffered at the Facility. 
It is important to remember that this matter comes before the Court on an appeal 
from a grant of summary judgment. Thus, reversal is appropriate unless Defendant 
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presented sufficient evidence to establish its right to judgment as a matter of law, and in 
making this determination, all factual issues must be resolved in Mr. Sandberg's favor. 
Mr. Sandberg respectfully submits that the current record certainly does not establish as 
a matter of law that Mr. Sandbergfs claim against the City would have been barred, 
because at the very least, there are disputed issues of fact as to whether application of 
the Governmental Immunity Act to bar Mr. Sandberg's claim would have violated the 
Open Courts provision. Accordingly, even if the Court were to determine that the 
City's decisions in building and operating the Facility were covered by the dis-
cretionary function exception, summary judgment still would not be appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff/appellant Albert Sandberg therefore respectfully requests that the Court 
vacate the Third District Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims and 
asks that the Court remand the matter to the Third District Court for further pro-
ceedings. 
DATED: July jff_, 2002. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
yy&ftu P ^fl^ 
Franci^J. Carney 
Stephen P. Horvat 
Attorneys for Albert Sandberg 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 10th day of July, 2002, two true and correct copies of BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT were served by first-class United States mail addressed to: 
Matthew L. Lalli 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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41 
ADDENDUM 
1. Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 1072-74. 
2. Transcript of Hearing, January 10, 2002 (portions), R. 1083. 
3. Preliminary Diagram of Facility, R. 643. 
4. Photographs of Facility, R. 931. 
5. Truiillo v. UDOT. 1999 UT App 227, 986 P.2d 752. 
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Sandy, Utah 84092 
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1 MR. CARNEY: Yeah. It says they may. 
2 THE COURT: Yeah. It just says if you're going to do 
3 it -
4 MR. CARNEY: Yeah. And in fact there are profitable 
5 private dumps in Utah. There's a new one in Utah County. 
6 There's that big one down in Price. 
7 THE COURT: Right. 
8 MR. CARNEY: And -
9 THE COURT: Right. They're making lots of money, I'm 
10 told. 
11 MR. CARNEY: I'm not going to discuss the ice on the 
12 sidewalk issue. 
13 THE COURT: I would think that she doesn't win on 
14 that. I mean I don't mind throwing it out, but I wanted to 
15 hear them on that one. And in all candor, it seems to me she 
16 maybe has prevailed on the other, but that's okay. I have to 
17 be candid. But I think on the discretion, I'm convinced that 
18 there's a lot of discretion went in here, and that's what they 
19 meant. 
20 MR. CARNEY: Well -
21 THE COURT: No. Not that you haven't ably stated the 
22 other side, but I mean that's my job here, to decide, well, 
23 were some policy makers involved. I'm happy they were. But go 
24 ahead. I mean I don't want to cut you off because I think your 
25 points, but for that one, all carry the day in my mind. 
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1 MR. CARNEY: Yeah. And I think -
2 THE COURT: And I guess it's a bummer because Horvat 
3 would have liked to have been here to argue it because he's 
4 the — but I guess it's an issue of level of policy decision 
5 making and who was given that job. I mean I can't imagine 
6 either the council that runs the dump or the Salt Lake City 
7 Council truly getting into the business of overseeing every 
8 aspect of a design. They delegate those things. To do so 
9 would be putting, in my mind, kind of a form over substance. 
10 If they had to okay every idea, every city council 
11 would just okay what their engineers have done. They don't 
12 have enough expertise and/or time and/or inclination. So 
13 that's why we have the principle of delegating things, and so 
14 it strikes me that here Salt Lake City delegated it to this 
15 Jera and this Stanford, and Stanford and Jera obviously went on 
16 the — I mean they didn't pay their way to go to dumps. They 
17 went on the city's dime to look at those things. 
18 So it seems to me that that was the policy that was 
19 intended. Look at it, weigh the pros and cons. They did, and 
20 so this to me is really a discretionary decision. 
21 MR. CARNEY: To the level of summary judgment? 
22 THE COURT: Well, if you - I mean it's a 
23 discretionary decision. They don't give up immunity. If they 
24 don't give up immunity, you can't sue them. If you can't sue 
25 them, Mr. Jensen didn't make an error in not bringing a claim 
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1 against them. 
2 MR. CARNEY: All right. 
3 THE COURT: Isn't that kind of the trail? 
4 MR. CARNEY: Sure. That's the trail. 
5 THE COURT: But I mean there is not going to be any 
6 believable evidence, is there, that they didn't consider it? 
7 If you get those two guys on, who's going to say — who in the 
8 world? I mean you don't have anybody. Such person doesn't 
9 exist. 
10 MR. CARNEY: Well, what about -
11 THE COURT: Jera didn't think about it. Well, yeah, 
12 I did. I'm sorry. I did. 
13 MR. CARNEY: Well, Jera was going to say that he — 
14 THE COURT: Jera's going to say he did. Stanford's 
15 going to say he did, and that's going to be the only evidence 
16 the jury will have, right? 
17 MR. CARNEY: And the evidence is going to be that no 
18 one else every considered it besides those two. 
19 THE COURT: Right. And so then that becomes a legal 
20 question, right? 
21 MR. CARNEY: Right. 
22 THE COURT: Are those of a sufficient policy-making 
23 status that their decision is a governmental weighing of cost, 
24 benefits, carrying on a purpose, all those considerations? And 
25 it has to be a legal question, no matter how you get down to 
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1 it. 
2 MR. CARNEY: Right. 
3 THE COURT: I'm not going to give that to the jury. 
4 Is he on the hierarchy? Where do you place him? I think 
5 that's what it comes down to. 
6 MR. CARNEY: Yeah. No, that is going to be your 
7 decision — 
8 THE COURT: Right. 
9 MR. CARNEY: - after hearing this. 
10 THE COURT: And so I think, given the way this falls 
11 out, that he's the engineer and given the job to do this, that 
12 it is a discretionary function, for the reasons Ms. Romero has 
13 raised to me. I understand your view to the contrary, but I 
14 don't think in this case, with these facts, that I could come 
15 out any differently. 
16 MR. CARNEY: And we would need a decision also on the 
17 constitutionality. 
18 THE COURT: Do I have to do that? Because can't I do 
19 it like the appellate guys do and say, You know, I've got this 
20 one — and in truth this is what happened. I looked at it. I 
21 tore back and forth. I mean — 
22 MR. CARNEY: I hate to make -
23 THE COURT: — I was jumping from side to side, you 
24 know. 
25 MR. CARNEY: Well, in your -
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1 THE COURT: That's a tough valley. 
2 MS. ROMERO: — a lot of money. I mean this case has 
3 been going for some time now. I think that, you know, this is 
4 not — as I read their pleadings, I didn't read it to raise the 
5 constitutionality of the — 
6 THE COURT: Let me go back. I think this is what 
7 I'll do. I'm going to grant the motion for the summary 
8 judgment on the part of the defendant on the basis that 
9 Sandberg couldn't have prevailed against Salt Lake City. 
10 Jensen's lawsuit wouldn't have gone anywhere because this would 
11 have been a discretionary function and they would have retained 
12 their immunity. And that the statute passed in 8^7 which 
13 overrode Standiford, changed the rules, it's constitutional. 
14 Because that's how I believe I'd come out, Mr. Carney. 
15 MR. CARNEY: Okay. 
16 THE COURT: And if it matters, if it's a benefit, if 
17 Standiford were in place, it was according to me in reviewing 
18 that today that I would have concluded that a landfill was not 
19 a core governmental function and it would not have been 
20 included under this umbrella. 
21 So I guess those first three parts. Right. It's 
22 constitutional, the landfill is not a core government function, 
23 but under the laws it is today. This is a clear, in my mind, 
24 exercise of a high-level policy discretionary function that 
25 allows for the immunity to be retained. 
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1 Ms. Romero, is there something more you need before 
2 you draw me an order? 
3 MS. ROMERO: No. I'll prepare an order and send it 
4 to Mr. Carney. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. Anything more that we need to 
6 discuss right now? 
7 MR. CARNEY: I don't think so. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you both. 
9 (WHEREUPON the hearing was concluded at 3:29 p.m.) 
61 
Exhibit 3 
SALT LAKi CITY A COUNTY 
PUBLIC RECYCLING FACILITY 
PHASE ONE 
•» t*a* t w n a * . «MM«t € • « « • • • • • • « • 
: • • • » • • * • 
MMUt C•«••«. 
M U U •«»UtUt- M U 
— — — •«* «*u «**• «m «••#. 
•••Mtl 4 I M N t . MM«ffM • • tttfl »*M 4MM ««?W f M M I I U W I I U 
Exhibit 4 
Photo taken shortly after 
Sandberg's fall in April 
1996 
Photo taken after 
barriers were erected 
and sidewalk widened 
in late 1996 
Exhibit 5 
752 Utah 986 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
on Macris's claims for successor liability be-
cause disputed issues of material fact exist as 
to whether Neways was Images's successor. 
The rule for a claim based on successor 
liability is that 
where one company sells or otherwise 
transfers all its assets to another company 
the latter is not liable for the debts and 
liabilities of the transferor, except where: 
(1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly 
agrees to assume such debts; (2) the 
transaction amounts to a consolidation or 
merger of the seller and purchaser; (3) the 
purchasing corporation is merely a contin-
uation of the selling corporation; or (4) the 
transaction is entered into fraudulently in 
order to escape liability for such debts. 
Florom v. Elliott, 867 F.2d 570, 575,n. 2 (10th 
Cir.1989). 
[8] 1116 Although the trial court found 
that Neways was Images's successor, our 
review of the record reveals that disputed 
issues of material fact exist as to whether 
Neways had the same officers and directors 
as Images,3 whether there was consideration 
for the transfer of assets from Images to 
Neways, and whether Images fraudulently 
transferred its assets to Neways to avoid 
paying Macris damages awarded in the first 
suit. Because material disputed facts exist, 
we conclude the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment o^n Macris's claim for 
successor liability. 
CONCLUSION 
1117 The facts giving rise to Macris's claim 
against Neways arose after Macris filed its 
amended complaint in the action against Im-
ages. As a result, the doctrine of claim 
preclusion did not require Macris to litigate 
its claims against Neways in the earlier ac-
tion. Thus, the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment in fayor of Neways on 
Macris's claims for fraudulent transfer and 
alter ego. Moreover, because material dis-
puted facts exist as to whether Neways was 
Images's successor, the trial court also erred 
in granting summary judgment in favor of 
Macris on its claims for successor liability. 
3. Neways admitted that it is Images's privy for 
purposes oFMacns's motion for summary judg-
ment. This admission, however, was made m 
We therefore reverse and remand for pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
1118 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. 
BENCH, Judge, and JAMES Z. DAVIS, 
Judge 
1999 UTApp 227 
Alan TRUJILLO and Sharon Trujillo, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPOR-
TATION; Ball, Ball & Brosamer, Inc., a 
California corporation; and John Does I 
through X, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 981331-CA. 
'Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 22, 1999. 
Motorists who were injured in head-on 
collision on stretch of interstate that was 
under construction sued Utah Department of 
Transportation and general contractor. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, 
Homer F. Wilkinson, J., granted summary 
judgment to defendants. Appeal was taken to 
Supreme Court, which transferred the mat-
ter. The Court of Appeals, Orme, held that: 
(1) UDOTs formulation of traffic control 
plan, including decision to use barrels rather 
than concrete barriers to separate traffic 
coming from opposing directions, was not a 
discretionary function so as to be immune 
from potential liability; (2) UDOTs alleged 
negligence in failing to reduce speed in con-
struction zone as called for in traffic control 
plan, failing to investigate accidents, and fail-
ing to meaningfully consider corrective action 
in response to letter from contractor, did not 
fall within discretionary function exception; 
opposition to Macris's motion for summary judg-
ment, thus, Neways is not bound by this admis-
sion for purposes of the successor liability claim. 
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(3) and questions of fact existed as to wheth-
er traffic control plan that was executed by 
general contractor was unreasonably danger-
ous, and as to whether contractor negligently 
executed that plan, precluding summary 
judgment for contractor. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Billings, J., concurred in result. 
1. Appeal and Error <&=>934(1) 
On appeal from summary judgment, 
Court of Appeals would state the fact in the 
light most favorable to appellants. 
2. Judgment «=»181(33) 
Because negligence cases often require 
the drawing of inferences from the facts, 
which is properly done by juries rather than 
judges, summary judgment is appropriate in 
,negligence cases only in the clearest instanc-
es. 
3. States <3=>191.4(1) 
"Sovereign immunity" precludes lawsuits 
against state governmental entities without 
the government's consent. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
4. States «=>112.1(2) 
Determination of whether Governmental 
Immunity Act bars negligence claim against 
state involves three-step inquiry: first, 
whether governmental conduct at issue was a 
governmental function to which general 
grant of immunity applies; second, if the 
conduct is a governmental function, whether 
the Act waives immunity for injuries arising 
out of the particular governmental function 
at issue; and finally, even if immunity is 
otherwise waived, whether an exception ap-
plies that retains immunity for the exercise 
of that governmental function. U.C.A.1953, 
63-30-3(1), 63-30-10. 
5. Municipal Corporations <s=>728 
Discretionary function exception to lia-
bility under Governmental Immunity Act 
serves two policies: it shields those govern-
mental acts and decisions impacting on large 
numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseen 
ways from individual and class legal actions, 
the continual threat of which would make 
public administration all but impossible, and 
it preserves the autonomy of coordinate 
branches of government. U.C.A.1953, 63-
30-3(1), 63-30-10, 
6. Municipal Corporations <§=>728 
Not every governmental action involving 
discretion is a discretionary function within 
the meaning of Governmental Immunity Act; 
only those decisions arising out of a govern-
mental entity's basic pohcymaking function 
qualify for immunity under the discretionary 
function exception. U.C JU953, 63-30-10(1). 
7. Municipal Corporations @=>728 
Governmental decisions that are the re-
sult of serious and extensive policy evalua-
tion, judgment, and expertise in numerous 
areas of concern qualify as immune "discre-
tionary functions" under Governmental Im-
munity Act. U.CA1953, 63-30-10(1). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
8. Municipal Corporations @=>728 
In contrast to governmental decisions 
involving evaluation of broad policy factors, 
acts, and decisions at the operational level 
are not "discretionary functions" for pur-
poses of the Governmental Immunity Act; 
therefore, while the formulation of policy is 
an immune discretionary function, the execu-
tion of already-formulated policies is not. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-30-10(1). 
9. Municipal Corporations <&=>728 
Allegations that a governmental entity 
has been negligent must be separately exam-
ined to determine if each act complained of is 
an immunized discretionary function or is 
merely an operational or ministerial imple-
mentation of already-established policy. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-30-3(1), 63-30-10(1). 
10. Municipal Corporations <®=*742(4) 
Immunity under Governmental Immuni-
ty Act is an affirmative defense which gov-
ernmental defendant bears the burden of 
proving. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-3(1), 63-30-
10(1). 
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11. Municipal Corporations <§=>728 
If governmental defendant posits immu-
nity to tort claim on an exercise of discretion, 
it must make a showing that a conscious 
balancing of risks and advantages took place. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-30-3(1), 63-30-10(1). 
12. Courts ©=>97(6) 
United States Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of discretionary function exception in 
Federal Tort Claims Act is not binding on 
Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
discretionary function exception in the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. 28 U.S.C-A. 
§§ 1346, 2671 et seq.; U.C.A.1953, 63-30-
3(1), 63-30-10(1). 
13. Municipal Corporations @=>728 
Governmental entity that asserts immu-
nity to tort claim under discretionary func-
tion exception must satisfy four-part test: (1) 
challenged act, omission, or decision must 
necessarily involve a basic governmental poli-
cy, program, or objective; (2) questioned act, 
omission, or decision must be essential to 
realization or accomplishment of that policy, 
program, or objective; (3) act, omission, or 
decision must require exercise of basic policy 
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on part 
of governmental agency involved; and (4) 
agency involved must possess the requisite 
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority 
and duty to do or make the challenged act, 
omission, or decision. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-
3(1), 63-30-10(1). 
14. Judgment <s=»181(33) 
Applicability of discretionary function 
exception to a tort claim against a govern-
mental entity is a fact-intensive inquiry that, 
by its very nature, is not particularly amena-
ble to summary judgment. U.CJL1953, 63-
30-3(1), 63-30-10(1). 
15. Automobiles <s=>278 
Formulation of traffic control plan by 
Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) 
in connection with resurfacing of interstate 
highway, including decision to use barrels 
rather than* concrete barriers to separate 
traffic coming from opposing directions, was 
not a discretionary function for purposes of 
immunity in action by motorists injured in 
head-on collision; traffic-control plan was for-
mulated by an unlicensed UDOT staff engi-
neer who did not perform at policy-making 
level, and UDOT failed to show that plan was 
the subject of intense scrutiny and review. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-30-3(1), 63-30-8, 63-30-10(1). 
16. Automobiles e=>277.1 
Alleged negligence by Utah Department 
of Transportation in connection with resur-
facing project for interstate highway, in fail-
ing to reduce speed in construction zone as 
called for in traffic control plan, failing to 
investigate accidents, and failing to meaning-
fully consider corrective action in response to 
letter from contractor raising safety concerns 
about traffic control plan, did not enjoy im-
munity under the discretionary function ex-
ception to tort claims by motorists injured in 
head-on collision; those alleged omissions in-
volved operational decisions in the implemen-
tation of, or failure to implement, pre-estab-
lished policy. U.CJL1953, 63-30-3(1), 63-
30-8, 63-30-10(1). 
17. Judgment ®=>181(33) 
Questions of fact existed as to whether 
state-designed traffic control plan that was 
executed by general contractor in connection 
with resurfacing of interstate highway was 
unreasonably dangerous, and as to whether 
contractor negligently executed that plan, 
precluding summary judgment for contractor 
in negligence action by motorists who were 
injured in head-on collision allegedly result-
ing from inadequate separation of traffic 
from opposing directions. 
18. Negligence <s=>1205(7) 
A contractor has a duty to perform the 
work required by its contract with that de-
gree of care ordinarily possessed and exer-
cised by other contractors doing the same or 
similar work in the same locality. 
19. Negligence <S=>1205(7) 
Contractor is not liable if it has merely 
carried out the plans, specifications, .and di-
rections given it, since in that case the re-
sponsibility is assumed by the employer, at 
least when the plans are not so obviously 
dangerous that no reasonable person would 
follow them. 
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Lack of evidence specifically describing 
as unreasonably dangerous a state-designed 
traffic control plan executed by contractor 
during highway resurfacing project was in-
consequential to determining contractor's po-
tential liability, on its motion for summary 
judgment, in action by motorists who were 
injured in head-on collision; no witness could 
properly give that opinion since it involved an 
ultimate question for the jury. 
21. Judgment ®=>185(5) 
Trial courts must avoid weighing evi-
dence and assessing credibility when ruling 
on motions for summary judgment. 
22. Judgment <s=>181(33) 
Juries are uniquely qualified to judge 
whether conduct falls above or below the 
standard of reasonable conduct deemed to 
have been set by the community, and there-
fore issues of reasonableness and negligence 
should not be decided on summary judgment 
except when the applicable standard of care 
is fixed by law and reasonable minds could 
reach but one conclusion as to the defen-
dants negligence under the circumstances. 
23. Negligence @=»1713 
Issue of proximate cause is a question of 
fact for the jury to determine in all but the 
clearest cases. 
Gary B. Ferguson, Williams& Hunt, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellants. 
Mark J. Williams, Plant, Wallace, Chris-
tensen & Kanell and Stephen P. Horvat, 
Anderson & Karrenberg, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee Utah Department of Transporta-
tion. 
Stephen G. Morgan and Joseph E. Min-
nock, Morgan, Meyer and Rice, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee Ball, Ball & Brosamer. 
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON, and 
ORME, JJ. 
ORME, Judge: 
HI Alan and Sharon Trujillo appeal the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of defendants Utah Department of 
Transportation (UDOT) and Ball, Ball and 
Brosamer, Inc. (Ball). The Trujillos were 
injured in a traffic accident on a stretch of I -
84 then under construction. The Trujillos 
challenge the trial court's rulings that the 
"discretionary function" variant of govern-
mental immunity shields UDOT from liability 
and that the general contractor. Ball, is not 
liable to the Trujillos because it followed 
plans and specifications that were not unrea-
sonably dangerous. The Trujillos' points are 
well-taken, and we reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
[1] 1F2 Because they appeal from sum-
mary judgment against them, we state the 
facts in the light most favorable to the Trujil-
los. See Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. 
Dist, 849 P.2d 1162,1162 (Utah 1993). 
113 On September 24, 1995, the Trujillos 
were driving eastbound on a winding, two-
lane stretch of 1-84 through Weber Canyon 
when a westbound pick-up truck veered into 
their lane and collided head-on with their 
motor home. The Trujillos suffered serious 
permanent injuries from the accident, and 
the driver of the pick-up died at the scene. 
114 1-84 is normally a four-lane, divided 
highway. However, at the time of the acci-
dent, the two eastbound lanes on the stretch 
of road where the accident occurred were 
closed for road resurfacing. Consequently, 
both directions of traffic had been channeled 
onto the two previously westbound lanes. 
Diversion of both directions of traffic onto 
two contiguous lanes is known as two-lane, 
two-way operations (TLTWO). The two 
lanes of the TLTWO were each ten to twelve 
feet wide with only two feet between them. 
Double yellow lines painted on the road sur-
face and hollow plastic barrels spaced at 100-
foot intervals divided the traffic flowing in 
opposite directions. 
115 Traffic in the construction zone had 
been redirected pursuant to a traffic control 
plan designed by UDOT and implemented by 
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Ball. Plans for the entire 1-84 project were 
drafted, formulated, and approved in a series 
of meetings and reviews over the course of 
approximately one year. Participants includ-
ed Federal Highway Administration repre-
sentatives; UDOT maintenance, engineering, 
design, and administrative personnel; and 
several city and county officials. However, 
although deposition testimony indicates that 
two UDOT engineers discussed the traffic 
control plan's separation of the two lanes, the 
record contains no evidence that the traffic 
control plan was ever specifically singled out 
for discussion, review, or approval at any 
point in the approval process. 
116 As general contractor, Ball was con-
tractually responsible for supervision of traf-
fic control in the construction zone. Ball's 
contract with UDOT .also required it to pro-
pose an alternate traffic control plan if it 
found UDOT's plan to be unsafe or inade-
quate. Shortly after construction on the pro-
ject began and four months before the Trujil-
los' accident, Ball's project manager, Shankar 
Narayanan, wrote to Larry Durrant, UDOT's 
project engineer, expressing his concern that 
UDOT's traffic control plan was inadequate. 
The letter stated in part: 
This letter is to reiterate our concerns with 
regard to UDOT's less than adequate traf-
fic control design for this project. In par-
ticular we feel that the use of drums at 
100' spacing to delineate opposing traffic in 
an Interstate highway is hazardous to the 
travelling public resulting in increasing the 
chances of accidents. 
11 7 Five days later, Durrant answered the 
letter, stating that "[i]f [Ball] feels UDOT's 
traffic control plans are inadequate, then as 
outlined [in the contract], the traffic control 
supervisor's responsibility is to prepare and 
submit revisions to the traffic control plans 
for the subject project." Narayanan testified 
in his deposition that he and Durrant dis-
cussed possible options for addressing his 
concerns, including the use of concrete barri-
ers. However, it is undisputed that no as-
pect of the traffic control plan was altered. 
1. As a convenience to the reader, and because 
the provisions in effect at the relevant times do 
not differ materially from the statutory provi-
11 8 About one year after the September 
1995 accident, the Trujillos filed suit against 
UDOT and Ball in Third District Court. The 
Trujillos alleged that UDOT and Ball were 
negligent in the design, supervision, and im-
plementation of the traffic control plan for 
the 1-84 resurfacing project. Specifically, 
the Trujillos alleged that UDOT and Ball 
negligently failed to install concrete barriers 
to prevent crossover accidents in the area 
where the Trujillos' accident took place. 
K 9 UDOT and Ball moved for summary 
judgment, arguing they owed no duty of care 
to protect the Trujillos from crossover acci-
dents. UDOT also argued that governmen-
tal immunity shielded it from tort liability. 
The trial court granted summary judgment 
in favor of both defendants, reasoning that 
"the decision made by UDOT in planning and 
designing the 1-84 resurfacing project, which 
included a Traffic Control Plan utilizing bar-
rels to separate [traffic in the TLTWO] was a 
discretionary act which created immunity for 
UDOT under the discretionary function ex-
ception to the Governmental Immunity Act." 
The court further ruled that '"in carrying out 
the plans and specifications for 1-84 drafted 
by UDOT, [Ball] acted in accordance with the 
plans and specifications, which were not so 
unreasonably dangerous that a reasonable 
contractor would not perform and carry out 
said plans and specifications." 
1110 The Trujillos timely appealed to the 
Utah Supreme Court, which transferred the 
matter to this court as permitted by Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Ull The Trujillos raise two issues on ap-
peal. First, the Trujillos argue the trial 
court erred when it concluded that govern-
mental immunity shields UDOT from liability 
for alleged negligence in planning and de-
signing the 1-84 resurfacing project, includ-
ing formulating the traffic control plan, and 
in ruling that design of the project was a 
discretionary function under a provision of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1997).1 Second, 
sions currently in effect, we cite to the most 
recent statutory codifications throughout this 
opinion, unless otherwise noted. 
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the Trujillos challenge the trial court's con-
clusions that, as a matter of law, the traffic 
control plan designed by UDOT was not 
unreasonably dangerous and that Ball was 
therefore not negligent in implementing it. 
[2] 1f 12 "Summary judgment is proper 
only when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law." Taylor u 
Ogden Sch. Dist, 927 P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 
1996). We review the trial court's conclusion 
that the parties raised no genuine issues of 
material fact, and its application of the gov-
erning law, for correctness. See Nelson v. 
Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 
1996). As we analyze the issues, we are 
mindfiil that, "because negligence cases often 
require the drawing of inferences from the 
facts, which is properly done by juries rather 
than judges, 'summary judgment is appropri-
ate in negligence cases only in the clearest 
instances.'" Id. (quoting Dwiggins v. Mor-
gan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991)). 
DISCRETIONAKY FUNCTION 
IMMUNITY 
[3] 1113 Sovereign immunity, rooted in 
the medieval British notion that the King 
could do no wrong, precludes lawsuits 
against governmental entities without the 
government's consent. See Brittain v. State, 
882 P.2d 666, 668-69 (Utah Ct.App.1994). 
A. Statutory Immunity Scheme 
H14 In 1965, the Utah Legislature passed 
the Governmental Immunity Act, codifying 
the sovereign immunity doctrine in Utah. See 
DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 432 (Utah 
1995) (citing 1965 Utah Laws 390, ch. 139, 
§ 3). The Act first grants general immunity 
from suit to governmental entities, then nar-
rows that general grant by waiving immunity 
for certain claims, and finally broadens im-
munity again with exceptions to the waivers 
that result in retaining immunity under cer-
tain circumstances. See Hansen v. Salt Lake 
County, 794 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah 1990). 
1115 Section 63-30-3(1) of the Act confers 
the general grant of immunity: "Except as 
may be otherwise provided in this chapter, 
all governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from the 
exercise of a governmental function[.]" Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1) (1997). "Govern-
mental function" is broadly defined as "any 
act, failure to act, operation, function, or 
undertaking of a governmental entity." Id. 
§ 63-30-2(4)(a) (1997). Cf. Keegan v. State, 
896 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1995) ("[T]he test for 
determining whether the activity undertaken 
is a governmental function focuses on wheth-
er that activity 'is of such a unique nature 
that it can only be performed by a govern-
mental agency or that it is essential to the 
core of governmental activity.'") (quoting 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 
1230,1236-37 (Utah 1980)). 
1116 Scattered sections of the Act waive 
immunity under particular circumstances. 
Thus, the Act permits claims against govern-
mental entities that involve contract obli-
gations, see Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 
(1997); property, see id. §§ 63-30-6, -10.5; 
defective public buildings and improvements, 
see id. § 63-30-9; and negligent acts and 
omissions of public employees. See id. § 63-
30-10. The Act specifically waives immunity 
for injuries caused by dangerous or defective 
highways. See id. § 63-30-8. When immu-
nity is waived, the "liability of the [govern-
mental] entity [is] determined as if the entity 
were a private person." Id. § 63-30-4(l)(b). 
1117 For certain kinds of claims, however, 
such waivers of immunity are restricted by a 
number of exceptions. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10 (1997). Thus, although the Act 
waives immunity for liability from injuries 
caused by defective conditions of public 
buildings and highways, and by the negli-
gence of public employees, immunity is re-
tained "if the injury ar[ose] out of, in connec-
tion with, or result[ed] from" one of nineteen 
enumerated circumstances. Id, For exam-
ple, immunity is retained if an injury resulted 
from a failure to revoke a permit, see id. 
§ 63-30-10(3), or make an inspection. See 
id. § 63-30-10(4). Immunity is also retained 
with respect to injuries caused by natural 
conditions on public land. See id § 63-30-
10(11). Of particular significance in this ap-
peal, immunity is retained for injuries that 
arise out of "the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
758 Utah 986 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
tionary function, whether or not the discre-
tion is abused." Id. § 63-30-10(1). 
[4] 1118 To determine whether the trial 
court correctly ruled that the Governmental 
Immunity Act bars the Trujillos from pro-
ceeding with their negligence claims against 
UDOT, we follow the three-step analysis es-
tablished by the Utah Supreme Court. See 
Keegan, 896 P.2d at 619-20; Ledfors v. Em-
ery County Sck Dist, 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 
(Utah 1993). Tracking the logic of the Act, 
the established analysis addresses three is-
sues. Applied to the facts of this case, they 
are, first, whether the design of the traffic 
control plan for the 1-84 resurfacing project 
was a governmental function to which section 
63-30-3(l)'s general grant of immunity ap-
plies, see Keegan, 896 P.2d at 619-20; sec-
ond, if the design of the traffic control plan is 
a governmental function, whether the Act 
waives immunity for injuries arising out of 
the particular governmental function at issue, 
see id.; and finally, even if immunity is oth-
erwise waived, whether an exception applies 
that retains immunity for the exercise of that 
governmental function. See id. 
H19 The parties agree that UDOT's con-
struction of 1-84 is a governmental function 
and, thus, that the Governmental Immunity 
Act applies to the Trujillos' claims against 
UDOT. Likewise, the parties agree that "im-
munity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for any injury caused by a defec-
tive, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any 
highway." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 
(1997). Here, however, agreement between 
the parties ends. Their disagreement cen-
ters on the final prong of the three-part test: 
whether, even though section 63-30-8's waiv-
er appears to permit the Trujillos to pursue 
their claims against UDOT for injuries they 
allege were caused by a defective, unsafe, or 
dangerous condition of 1-84, an exception 
specified in the Act nevertheless bars the 
Trujillos5 action, UDOT argues the trial 
court correctly concluded that the "discre-
tionary function" exception does just that 
[5] 1120 Section 63-30-10 provides, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of ai 
employee committed within the scope o 
employment except if the injury arises ou 
of, in connection with, or results from 
(1) the exercise or performance or the 
failure to exercise or perform a discre 
tionary function, whether or not the dis-
cretion is abused 
Id. § 63-30-10. Utah precedent interpreting 
and applying the discretionary function ex-
ception has articulated two policies served b} 
the exception. First, the discretionary func-
tion exception " ' "shield[s] those governmen-
tal acts and decisions impacting on large 
numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseen 
ways from individual and class legal actions, 
the continual threat of which would make 
public administration all but impossible." *" 
Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623 (citations omitted). 
Second, the exception preserves the autono-
my of coordinate branches of government. 
To that end, " *[w]here the responsibility for 
basic policy decisions has been committed to 
one of the branches of our tri-partite system 
of government, the courts have refrained 
from sitting in judgment of the propriety of 
those decisions.'" Id. (quoting Little v. Utah 
State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 51 
(Utah 1983)). 
B. Policy-making Versus Operations 
[6] 1121 Discretionary function immunity 
has been interpreted and applied in a man-
ner consistent with the policies it was intend-
ed to promote. Thus, the Utah Supreme 
Court has recently stated that, in comparison 
to the ancient doctrine of sovereign immuni-
ty, discretionary function immunity is "a dis-
tinct, more limited form of immunity [that] 
should be applied only when a plaintiff is 
challenging a governmental decision that in-
volves a basic policy-making function." Nel-
son v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 575 
(Utah 1996). Not every governmental action 
involving discretion is a discretionary func-
tion within the meaning of the Act. See Bige-
low v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50, 53 (Utah 1980). 
Were it otherwise, the exception would swal-
low the rule, as almost all governmental deci-
sions involve some discretion. See Nelson, 
919 P.2d at 575; Bigelow, 618 P.2d at 53. 
Consequently, only those decisions arising 
out of a governmental entity's basic policy-
TRUJILLO v. UTAH DEPT. OF TRANSP. 
Cite as 986 P.2d 752 (UtahApp. 1999) 
Utah 759 
making function qualify for immunity under 
the discretionary function exception. See 
Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623. 
[7] 1122 "Although the term 'discretion-
ary function' is not susceptible to precise 
definition in all legal contexts," Nelson, 919 
P.2d at 575, case law interpreting discretion-
ary function immunity 'has stated that 
" '[cfliscretionary acts are those "character-
ized by a high degree of discretion and judg-
ment involved in weighing alternatives and 
making choices with respect to public policy 
and planning."'" Keegan, 896 P.2d at 625 
(citations omitted). Governmental decisions 
that are " ' "the result of serious and exten-
sive policy evaluation, judgment, and exper-
tise in numerous areas of concern"' " qualify-
as immune discretionary functions. Id. (cita-
tions omitted). 
[8,9] 1f23 In contrast to governmental 
decisions involving evaluation of broad policy 
factors, "acts and decisions at the operational 
level—those everyday, routine matters"—are 
not discretionary functions. Nelson, 919 
P.2d at 575. Therefore, while the formula-
tion of policy is an immune discretionary 
function, "the execution of already-formulat-
ed policies" is not. Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623. 
Allegations that a governmental entity has 
been negligent must be separately examined 
to determine if each act complained of is an 
immunized discretionary function or is mere-
ly an operational or ministerial implementa-
tion of already-established policy. See Han-
sen, 794 P.2d at 846; Doe v. ArgueUes, 716 
P.2d 279, 283 (Utah 1985). See also Rocky 
Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. u Salt Lake 
City Corp., 784 P.2d 459, 463-64 (Utah 1989) 
(analyzing separately each allegation of negli-
gence under exception retaining immunity 
for negligent failure to inspect or inadequate 
inspection). 
1124 Guided by these distinctions, prior 
case law has held, for example, that "[deci-
sions made by [Salt Lake City] regarding 
the design, capacity, and construction of 
their flood control systems" were immunized 
under the discretionary function exception 
because the decisions were "the result of ser-
ious and extensive policy evaluation, judg-
ment, and expertise in numerous areas of 
concern[, including] geological, environmen-
tal, financial, and urban planning and devel-
opmental concerns, and financial concerns." 
Rocky Mountain Thrift, 784 P.2d at 463. 
Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that the process by which UDOT determines 
when railroad crossing warnings will be up-
graded is a discretionary function. See Dun-
can v. Union Pac. R.R., 842 P.2d 832, 835 
(Utah 1992). Finally, our Supreme Court 
recently held that it was an act of discretion 
for UDOT to decide not to replace a concrete 
barrier when, after two road surface over-
lays, it no longer reached the height re-
quired by safety standards. See Keegan, 896 
P.2d at 619, 626. The Court held that "the 
determination of whether to raise the con-
crete median barrier was a decision inher-
ently bound up in economic, political, and 
safety considerations, as indicated by [the 
UDOT safety engineer's] safety study report 
and [the UDOT project design engineer's] 
cost-benefits report." Id. at 625. 
1125 In contrast, the Court has ruled that 
the State was not immune from suit for 
injuries caused by an allegedly dangerous 
traffic control system because, "[although 
the acts of the State . . . in designing the 
traffic control system involve some degree of 
discretion, as do almost all acts, the design of 
the traffic control system does not involve 
the *basic policy making level.'" Bigelow, 
618 P.2d at 53. Similarly, in Andrus v. State, 
541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975), our Supreme 
Court held that "[t]he decision to build [a] 
highway and specifying its general location 
were discretionary functions, but the prepar-
ing of plans and specifications and the super-
vision of the manner in which the work was 
carried out cannot be labeled discretionary 
functions." Id at 1120. Thus, the Court 
held that the State enjoyed no immunity 
from suit for water damage to property al-
legedly arising out of the design and specifi-
cations for construction of a highway. See 
id. 
U26 Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court 
held in Carroll v. State ex rel. Road Comm'n, 
27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972), that 
"the decision of the road supervisor to use 
berms as the sole means of protection for the 
unwary traveler [proceeding onto a closed 
road] was not a basic policy decision essential 
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to the realization or accomplishment of some 
basic governmental policy, program, or ob-
jective," but was merely a determination 
made at the operational level. 496 P.2d at 
891-92. See also Nelson, 919 P.2d at 575-76 
(holding that failure of governmental entity 
to repair breach in fence through which child 
gained access to river was not immune dis-
cretionary function); Arguelles, 716 P.2d at 
283 (holding that decision to return juvenile 
offender to community was immunized dis-
cretionary function, but alleged negligence in 
monitoring juvenile's treatment after release 
was not similarly immune); Little v. Utah 
State Din of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 51-
52 (Utah 1983) (holding that, even if decision 
to place high-need child in foster home was 
immune discretionary function, alleged fail-
ure of Family Services to evaluate foster 
home, supervise placement, and protect child 
from harm was actionable). 
[10-13] H27 Immunity is an affirmative 
defense which the defendant bears the bur-
den of proving. See Nelson, 919 P.2d at 574. 
If UDOT "posits immunity on . . . an exer-
2. We note that the United States Supreme Court, 
in interpreting a similar discretionary function 
exception in the Federal Tort Claims Act, has not 
required such a showing. See United States v. 
Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325, 111 S.Ct 1267, 
1275, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991) (holding that, un-
der FTCA, "[discretionary conduct is not con-
fined to the policy or planning level," and "acts 
of agency employees in executing [a] program" 
are also discretionary). Of course, this analytic 
approach is not binding on our interpretation of 
the discretionary function exception in the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, and the analysis 
consistentiy employed by the Utah Supreme 
Court is to the contrary. 
In Carroll v. State ex rel. Road Commission, 27 
Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972), one of the 
earliest Utah cases interpreting the discretionary 
function exception, our Supreme Court recog-
nized that the discretionary function exception in 
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act was pat-
terned after a similar provision in the Federal 
Tort Claims Act. See 27 Utah 2d at 388, 496 P.2d 
at 891. Later, in Little v. Utah State Division of 
Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), the 
Court cited federal case law in support of the 
policy-versus-operations distinction first 'an-
nounced in Carroll See Little, 667 P.2d at 51 
("[T]he lines in federal cases have been consis-
tently drawn between those functions ascribable 
to the policy making level and those to the opera-
tional level [.]") (citing Dalehite v. United States, 
346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953); 
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 
cise of discretion, it must make a showing 
that a conscious balancing of risks and ad-
vantages took place."2 Little, 667 P.2d at 
51. Accordingly, to successfully bear its bur-
den of proving immunity from suit for the 
Trujillos> injuries, UDOT must show that 
each act of alleged negligence qualifies as -a 
discretionary function under the following 
four-part test: 
"(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or 
decision necessarily involve a basic govern-
mental policy, program, or objective? (2) 
Is the questioned act, omission, or decision 
essential to the realization or accomplish-
ment of that policy, program, or objective 
as opposed to one which would not change 
the course or direction of the policy, pro-
gram, or objective? (3) Does the act, 
omission, or decision require the exercise 
of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and 
expertise on the part of the governmental 
agency involved? (4) Does the governmen-
tal agency involved possess the requisite 
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authori-
76 S.Ct 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955)). More recent-
ly, the United States Supreme Court, in United 
States v. Gaubert, referred to the policy-versus-
operations distinction as a misinterpretation of 
its earlier cases. See 499 U.S. at 326, 111 S.Ct. 
at 1275 ("[T]he distinction in Dalehite was mere-
ly description of the level at which the chal-
lenged conduct occurred. There was no sugges-
tion that decisions made at an operational level 
could not also be based on policy."). 
We recognize that the Keegan court cited a 
Fourth Circuit case that followed Gaubert's ab-
rogation of the policy/operational distinction. 
See Bourn v. United States, 986 F.2d 716 (4th 
Cir.1993). The Keegan court quoted Bourn for 
the proposition that, "to determine whether a 
certain decision involved the exercise of a discre-
tionary function, courts must 'look to the nature 
of the challenged decision in an objective, or 
general sense, and ask whether the decision is 
one which we would expect inherently to be 
grounded in considerations of policy.' " Keegan, 
896 P.2d at 625 (quoting Bourn, 986 F.2d at 721). 
However, because Keegan applied the Little test 
and relied on evidence that the decisions there at 
issue were in fact made on the policy level after 
careful study and deliberation, we do not consid-
er Keegan to have appreciably detracted from the 
validity of the long-standing policy-versus-opera-
tional analysis, which requires evidence that "a 
conscious balancing of risks and advantages took 
place" regarding each allegedly negligent act. 
Little, 667 P.2d at 51. 
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ty and duty to do or make the challenged 
act, omission, or decision?" 
Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624 (quoting Little, 667 
P.2d at 51). 
[14] 1128 This is a fact-intensive inquiry 
that, by its very nature, is not particularly 
amenable to summary judgment. See, e.g., 
Hansen, 794 P.2d at 846 (reversing summary 
judgment of immunity and remanding for 
further factual development regarding 
whether decision was one of policy or opera-
tion); Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, 784 
P.2d at 464 (same). But see Duncan, 842 
P.2d at 836 (affirming summary judgment for 
State on immunity grounds). 
C. Analysis of Trujillos, Claims 
1t 29 The Trujfflos charge UDOT with five 
separate acts of negligence. The Trujillos 
allege UDOT negligently (1> designed and 
implemented an unsafe traffic control plan 
for the 1-84 resurfacing project; (2) used 
hollow plastic barrels rather than concrete 
barriers to separate traffic in the construc-
tion zone; (3) failed to reduce the speed limit 
in the construction zone as directed by the 
traffic control plan; (4) failed to investigate 
other accidents that had occurred in the con-
struction zone prior to the Trujiilos, accident 
and to make appropriate adjustments in traf-
fic control to reduce the risk of future acci-
dents; and (5) failed to alter traffic control 
techniques in response to the concerns of 
Ball's project manager, Mr. Narayanan. 
While we believe UDOTs basic decision to 
undertake the 1-84 resurfacing project nec-
essarily would be considered an immune dis-
cretionary function, we hold, on the record 
before us, that the discretionary function ex-
ception does not immunize UDOT from the 
daims the Trujillos have raised. 
[15] 130 We first consider the Trujillos' 
claim that UDOT negligently designed an 
inadequate traffic control plan for the 1-84 
resurfacing project. We hold that the record 
on appeal does not support the trial court's 
conclusion that the design of the traffic con-
trol plan and its preference for barrels over 
barriers was made at the immunized policy-
making level. The evidence presented by 
UDOT falls short of the standards set forth 
in prior Utah Supreme Court precedent. 
Keegan provides an illustrative contrast. In 
that case, our Supreme Court detailed the 
process by which UDOT decided not to re-
place a concrete barrier even though it knew 
planned surface overlays would reduce its 
height below required safety standards. The 
Supreme Court noted that, before the second 
surface overlay, a UDOT safety studies engi-
neer "carried out a comprehensive study of 
accident rates" from which he created a safe-
ty study report. Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624. 
The report concluded that safety would not 
be adversely affected if the barrier were not 
replaced during the second overlay. See id. 
Also before the second resurfacing, a UDOT 
project design engineer prepared a cost-ben-
efit report using information from the safety 
study report. See id. The cost-benefit re-
port considered factors such, as 
the cost of removing and replacing the 
barrier, the already-scheduled' major re-
surfacing project for 1-80 in five or six 
years, the added delays and inconvenience 
to users of the highway if the barrier were 
to be dug up and replaced, and the possi-
bility that the job could not be completed 
inexpensively and with minimal disruption 
to traffic during the short construction sea-
son in the canyon. 
Id. This study and report were conducted 
and compiled "by senior engineers and circu-
lated throughout and debated within the de-
partment" Id After parsing the particulars 
of the decision-making process, the Court 
concluded that "UDOT's decision involved 
just the sort of policy-driven weighing of 
costs and benefits that the discretionary 
function exception was meant to protect." 
Id. 
1f 31 In this appeal, on the other hand, it is 
undisputed that the traffic control plan was 
formulated by an unlicensed UDOT staff en-
gineer—an employee who did not perform at 
the policy-making level. Further, while the 
record on appeal contains a general descrip-
tion of the multi-level approval process for 
plans and specifications pertaining to the I-
84 resurfacing project, UDOT's evidence 
does no more than establish the traffic con-
trol plan could have been discussed in these 
meetings. UDOT does not point us to evi-
dence that the traffic control plan and the 
762 Utah 986 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
barrels-versus-barriers decision was in fact 
the subject of intense scrutiny and review. 
UDOT now characterizes the decision to use 
barrels as a "tough choice" between two traf-
fic separation methods and draws our atten-
tion to the relative risks and benefits of 
barrels and barriers. However, UDOT's evi-
dence shows these issues were addressed 
only in private discussions between the pro-
ject design engineer who drafted the traffic 
control plan and UDOT's Region One Design 
Engineer. These facts are insufficient to 
bring the formulation of the traffic control 
plan within the scope of discretionary func-
tion immunity. 
1132 Similarly, the Trujillos presented evi-
dence to the trial court that the Manual of 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), 
adopted by UDOT, listed particular "industry 
standard" factors to be considered before 
implementing TLTWO, specifically to guard 
against head-on collisions. The Trujillos pre-
sented additional evidence that an Occupa-
tional Safety Report for the stretch of 1-84 
involved in the resurfacing project was avail-
able, and, if consulted by UDOT, would have 
shown that accidents in the construction zone 
clustered around the area where the Trujil-
los' accident took place. Nevertheless, while 
the Occupational Safety Report and evidence 
of traffic-volume reports appear in the rec-
ord, UDOT presented no documentary or 
testimonial evidence that either the MUTCD 
factors, the Occupational Safety Report, or 
the traffic volume reports were discussed in 
the course of approving the traffic control 
plan.3 
1133 UDOT argues the Governmental Im-
munity Act does not require it to consult 
written studies or to prove that specific is-
sues were addressed during the decision-
making process. UDOT contends the hold-
ing of Keegan is that decisions regarding 
3. Whether due to the Occupational Safety Report 
or on some other basis, UDOT did see fit to 
require concrete barriers rather than plastic bar-
rels to protect the construction crews working on 
the shoulder of the highway from traffic. 
4. Mr. Durrant's letter responding to Mr. Naray-
anan's concern is perhaps more interesting for 
what it does not say than for what it does say. If 
indeed the traffic control plan had been the re-
sult of the kind of policy analysis the discretion-
ary function exception contemplates, we might 
highway median design and lane separation 
are inherently discretionary functions. We 
disagree. Utah cases interpreting the dis-
cretionary function exception, including Kee-
gan, have focused on the process by which 
decisions of governmental entities are made. 
Under Utah precedent, we cannot assume 
UDOT's traffic control plan was the product 
of the exercise of policy-level discretion sim-
ply because it dealt with highway median 
design. UDOT proffered no evidence that 
the formulation of the traffic control plan and 
the decision to separate opposing lanes of 
traffic with hollow plastic barrels were 
"
 l
 "the result of serious and extensive policy 
evaluation, judgment, and expertise in nu-
merous areas of concern."'" Keegan, 896 
P2d at 625 (citations omitted). On the rec-
ord before us, therefore, we hold that 
UDOT's formulation of the traffic control 
plan and its decision to use barrels rather 
than barriers have not been shown to rise to 
the immunized policy-making level. 
[16] H 34 We next consider the negligent 
acts UDOT allegedly committed after the 
traffic control plan was in effect in the con-
struction zone. We hold that these remain-
ing allegations of negligence involve opera-
tional decisions on the part of UDOT, which 
implemented or failed to implement pre-es-
tablished policy. See Nelson, 919 P.2d at 
575-76; Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623. Specifical-
ly, we hold that failure to reduce speed in the 
construction zone as called for in the plan, 
failure to investigate accidents, and failure to 
meaningfully consider corrective action in re-
sponse to Mr. Narayanan's letter4 all are 
"acts and decisions at the operational level— 
those every day, routine matters" that do no4t 
enjoy immunity under the discretionary func-
tion exception. Nelson, 919 P.2d at 575. 
expect Mr. Durrant to have responded that, as a 
matter of policy, UDOT had determined that the 
traffic control plan, as written, adequately bal-
anced competing concerns, such as safety and 
cost, and, because it was the product of extensive 
policy evaluation, it could not casually be al-
tered. This, however, was not the tenor of his 
reply. Instead, he merely invited Mr. Narayanan 
to propose an alternative plan if he were so 
concerned. 
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1135 The acts and omissions of which the 
rujillos complain are analogous to those ad-
ressed in Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279, 
83 (Utah 1985), in .which the Utah Supreme 
lourt ruled that the State did not enjoy 
nmunity when a juvenile with a history of 
exual violence assaulted a young girl while 
e was in a community placement while in 
Itate custody. See id. The Court recog-
ized that the decision to place the juvenile 
ffender in the community was an immune 
Iiscretionary decision made by the superin-
endent of the Youth Detention Center. See 
d. The Court ruled, however, that the fail-
ire of the superintendent to ensure that the 
jffender received proper therapy, which had 
)een prescribed by the superintendent him-
jelf, was actionable because it concerned the 
nanner in which the superintendent imple-
nented policy and not the policy itself. See 
id 
1136 The Trujillos presented unrebutted 
evidence that the speed limit in the construc-
tion zone remained at 65 miles per hour 
despite the fact that the traffic control plan 
called for the speed limit to be reduced to 50 
m.p.h. The Trujillos presented additional evi-
dence that although two crossover accidents 
had occurred in the construction zone before 
the Trujillos' accident, TJDOT had not inves-
tigated or analyzed either of them even 
though the traffic control plan.mandated that 
accidents in the construction zone be investi-
gated and analyzed. 
1137 These alleged omissions occurred af-
ter the allegedly unsafe and inadequate traf-
fic control plan was adopted. Therefore, to 
echo the Court's conclusion in Doe v. Arg-
uelles, even if the formulation of the plan was 
an immune discretionary function, immunity 
would not extend so far as to protect UDOT 
from liability for negligently executing the 
plan. 
D. Conclusion 
1 38 On the record before us, UDOT has 
not demonstrated1 that discretionary function 
5. Ball makes much of the fact that no evidence 
directly states that the traffic control plan was 
unreasonably dangerous. We note, however, 
that no witness couLd properly give that opinion 
because it is an ultimate question to be deter-
mined by the jury. The absence of evidence 
specifically describing the plan as unreasonably 
hnmunity shields it from liability. The Tru-
jillos' evidence, both as to the formulation 
and execution of the traffic control plan, re-
futes UDOT's contention that the relevant 
decisions were made at the policy level rath-
er than at the operational level. 
LIABILITY OF BALL 
[17-19] H 39 We now consider Ball's po-
tential liability to the Trujillos. A contractor 
has a duty to "perform the work required by 
its contract . . . with that degree of care 
ordinarily possessed and exercised by other 
contractors doing the same or similar work 
in'[the same] locality." Andrus v. State, 541 
P2d 1117, 1121 (Utah 1975). However, a 
"contractor is not liable if [it] has merely 
carried out the plans, specifications and di-
rections given [it], since'in that case the 
responsibility is assumed by the employer, at 
least when the plans are not so obviously 
dangerous that no reasonable [person] would 
follow them." Leininger v. Stearns-Roger 
Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 2d 37, 41,-404 V2d 33, 36 
(1965) (emphasis added). It follows that Ball 
can be held liable for„the Trujillos' damages 
if, as the Trujillos allege, it negligently per-
formed its responsibilities under its contract 
with UDOT or, if the traffic control plan was 
so dangerous that a reasonable person would 
have refused to follow it. 
[20] H 40 First, regarding their allegation 
that UDOT's traffic control plan was so un-
reasonably dangerous that Ball should have 
refused to implement it, the Trujillos pre-
sented expert testimony that the plan failed 
to comply with MUTCD.5 Moreover, the 
Trujillos allege that the letter from Ball's 
project manager, Mr. Narayanan, to UDOT's 
Larry Durrant shows that Ball was aware 
that separating opposing traffic with hollow 
plastic barrels posed an unreasonable danger 
to travelers on 1-84. In the letter, Mr. Na-
rayanan first voiced a concern over the meth-
dangerous is, therefore, inconsequential. See 
Gaw v. Statt ex rel. Dep't of Tramp., 798 E.2d 
1130, 1137 & n. 10 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (in sum-
mary judgment context, expert witness affidavits 
must not contain merely concLusory statements), 
cert, denied, unpublished order of Utah Supreme 
Court (Jan. 11, 1991). 
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od of separation and then tried to disclaim 
liability, stating that Ball "will implement the 
traffic control as shown on the plans and 
specification^], however we will not be in a 
position to accept liability on accidents due to 
the conditions mentioned above." Five days 
later, Mr. Durrant responded, informing Mr. 
Narayanan that "[i]f Ball . . . feels UDOT's 
traffic control plans are inadequate, then as 
outlined [in the contract], the traffic control 
supervisor's responsibility is to prepare and 
submit revisions to the traffic control plans 
for the subject project." Although Mr. Na-
rayanan testified that he and Mr. Durrant 
discussed and resolved his concerns, Mr. 
Durrant did not recall any such conversation, 
and the plan was never revised. Thus, we 
conclude the evidence presented by the Tru-
jillos is sufficient to create a material ques-
tion of fact about whether the traffic control 
plan was unreasonably dangerous and wheth-
er Ball negligently failed to propose safer 
alternatives, as required by its contract with 
UDOT. 
1f 41 The Trujillos further allege Ball was 
negligent in failing to reduce the speed limit 
in the construction zone, keep an accident 
log, and investigate accidents that occurred 
in the construction zone, as required by the 
traffic control plan. Ball was responsible for 
traffic control in the construction zone, a 
responsibility it carried out in part through 
supervision and implementation of the traffic 
control plan. Nonetheless, although the traf-
fic control plan called for a 50 m.p.h. speed 
limit through the construction zone, the 
speed limit remained at 65 m.p.h. Similarly, 
although the plan required Ball to include 
accident information in its project log, Ball 
failed to investigate the two accidents that 
occurred in the construction zone prior to the 
Trujillos' accident. These alleged acts of 
negligence, if proven, constitute negligent 
performance of Ball's duties under its con-
tract with UDOT. Ball obviously cannot avail 
itself of the defense that it is not liable 
because it merely followed the plans and 
specifications provided by UDOT if in fact it 
failed to comply with the specifications of the 
traffic control plan. Ball, therefore, can be 
held liable for its negligent noncompliance 
with the plan whether or not the traffic 
control plan itself is found to be unreason-
ably dangerous. 
[21-23] 1142 These are questions of fact a 
jury must decide. Trial courts must avoid 
weighing evidence and assessing credibility 
when ruling on motions for summary judg-
ment. See Dubois v. Grand Central, 872 
P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah Ct.App.1994). More-
over, "it is peculiarly fitting that [a jury 
should] determine" whether the conduct of 
Ball comported with " 'ordinary, reasonable 
care under the circumstances.'" Cornfield v. 
Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah 
Ct.App.1992) (quoting DeWeese u J.C. Pen-
ney Co., 5 Utah 2d 116, 121, 297 P.2d 898, 
901 (1956)), cert denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 
1993). Juries are uniquely qualified to judge 
whether conduct " 'falls above or below the 
standard of reasonable conduct deemed to 
have been set by the community.'" Dar-
rington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 459 n. 4 (Utah 
CtA.pp.1991) (citations omitted). Issues of 
reasonableness and negligence, therefore, 
should not be decided on summary judgment 
except when " t h e applicable standard of 
care is "fixed by law," and reasonable minds 
could reach but one conclusion as to the 
defendant's negligence under the circum-
stances.' " Id. at 459 (citations omitted). 
Likewise, the issue of proximate cause is a 
question of fact for the jury to determine in 
all but the clearest cases. See Nelson ex rel 
Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 
574 (Utah 1996). 
CONCLUSION 
1143 UDOT failed to prove, as a matter of 
law, that it was immune from liability to the 
Trujillos under the discretionary function 
doctrine, and questions of material fact per-
meate the issue of Ball's potential liability to 
the Trujillos. Accordingly, we reverse the 
summary judgment in favor of UDOT and 
Ball and remand to the trial court for trial or 
such other proceedings as may now be ap-
propriate. 
1144 I CONCUR: NORMAN H. 
JACKSON, Judge. 
